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Executive Summary
The report presents the results of an evaluation of Hogaan iyo Nabad, a Community
Driven Reconstruction (CDR) programme in Somaliland and Somalia.The programme
was funded by DFID and implemented by CARE, DRC and IRC, and aimed at strength-
ening local governance in rural and rather remote districts in Somaliland (Erigabo) and
Puntland (Galkayo and Burtinle). To work towards making local government more re-
sponsive, accountable and effective, the programme aimed to achieve two outcomes:
Outcome 1: Citizens’ participation in decision-making and conflict management is en-
hanced.
Outcome 2: Village-level institutions have improved their ability to plan, manage and
advocate for community priorities.
Based on a mixed methods design, the evaluation assesses whether these two outcomes
have been achieved and examines the mechanisms by which the programme worked. Qual-
itative research was conducted to find out if basic assumptions and concepts of the pro-
gramme corresponded with local meanings and practices. Findings were used to opera-
tionalise and, if necessary, refine these concepts for the evaluation and to support the
interpretation of evaluation results. Quantitative tools (household and leadership survey)
were used to estimate programme effects. The originally planned baseline/endline com-
parison was dropped in favour of a design that compares villages that have received the
Hogaan programme (implementation villages) with similar villages that have not (non-
implementation villages).
The main evaluation findings were:
Participation
Positive Results
• An increase in participation, driven by the relationship of citizens (including women
and youth) with the formal structures of governance at the village (Village Council)
and district (District Council) levels.
• An increase in citizens’ perception of inclusiveness in decision-making.
• (Unintended) A decrease in the difference in participation rates between majority
and minority clans (not occupational caste groups)
We did not find evidence of any overall change in:
x
• Overall responsiveness of local governance institutions
• Inclusion rates with respect to gender and youth.
• Empowerment of youth or women to participate in planning and decision-making.
Governance
• Significant change in citizens’ views of governance responsibilities at village and
district levels.
– Significant increase in the opinion that the Village Council (VC) should protect
rights and provide services.
– Parallel decrease in the opinion that they should be provided by the District
(DC).
Positive Results
• An improvement in the relationship between village authorities and the District
Council.
• An increase in trust in Village and District Councils.
• An improvement in the resolution of leadership conflicts.
We did not find evidence of any overall change in:
• Overall citizens’ satisfaction with local governance service delivery.
• The balance of responsibilities between formal (VC and DC) and customary (elders
and religious leaders) authorities.
• Overall Perceptions of conflict resolution (despite leadership conflict effects).
• Overall satisfaction with locally governing institutions (despite increased trust in
VC and DC).
Mechanisms
• Strong relationship between programme participation and positive view of village
level governance.
• Large attitudinal differences between programme participants and non-participants
in Hogaan villages.
• No major attitudinal differences between programme non-participants in Hogaan
villages and citizens in non-implementation villages.
• Membership in community groups provides a major mechanism for selection of par-
ticipants in programme.
• No evidence of standard spill-over effects.
• Evidence of selection effects.
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Chapter 1
Context of the Hogaan Programme and Evaluation
The chapter provides background information on Community Driven Development and
Reconstruction (CDD/R) programming and evaluation, and outlines objectives and im-
plementation of the Hogaan programme.
1.1 Community Driven Development/Reconstruction
The support for participatory processes and Community Driven Development (CDD)
has rapidly gained popularity among development organisations and donors.1 CDD ap-
proaches focus on the local and aim at strengthening the ability of social groups to manage
their own development and to gather their own resources for it without depending too
much on formal government structures, which are often not functioning adequately or
have been destroyed during violent conflicts.
Since the new millennium, the focus of peace-building has gradually shifted towards
state-building, and international resources were increasingly spent to strengthen legitimate
forms of governance (Chandler 2010). Although labelled as state or institutional recon-
struction, many of these programmes entail a significant institutional overhaul including
provisions to support transparency, efficiency and accountability (Suhrke 2007: 1792).
CDD approaches were adapted to this general shift towards institution and state-building
and are, under the label of Community Driven Reconstruction (CDR), increasingly used
as instruments to strengthen, re-establish, overhaul or build up local level governance in
post-conflict settings.
One of these CDR programmes was, between 2012 and 2015, implemented in Somalia,
in particular in Somaliland and Puntland. The programme was evaluated by Dr Jutta
Bakonyi (lead consultant), Dr Gidon Cohen (lead quantitative analysis) and Dr Pierre-
Olivier Bédard from Durham University (UK). Dr Markus Hoehne from Leipzig University
conducted parts of the qualitative research and analysis in Erigabo. Field research and
especially implementation of the quantitative surveys was organised by the Observatory
of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) in Hargeysa and Garowe.
1 According to Wong (2012: IV) the World Bank supports 400 CDD projects in 94 countries with more
than $30 billion. Mansuri and Rao (2013: IX) claim that the World Bank has, in the last decade, spent
about $85 Billion in support of local participatory development.
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1.2 Evaluations of Community Driven Programmes
Evaluations of CDD/R approaches have not shown conclusive results. Large variations
of evaluation questions, evaluation designs and methodologies have rendered a synthesis
of findings difficult. A first review of CDD projects concluded that evidence of CDD
results lags behind the rate and speed at which new projects are implemented or scaled-
up (Mansuri and Rao 2004: 3). In the last decade, some organisations, among them DFID,
IRC and the World Bank, have invested in rigorous impact evaluations in Afghanistan,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Aceh in Indonesia, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Additionally the World Bank has undertaken two reviews of evaluations of projects that
were based on induced participation (Mansuri and Rao 2013)2 and of CDD programmes
more generally (Wong). The findings of the evaluations and reviews are mixed, ranging
from overall zero impact (DRC, Humphreys et al. 2014) to scarce or modest impact on
social cohesion (Liberia, Fearon et al. 2008), weak (Aceh, Barron et al. 2009) to mixed
impact on governance (Afghanistan, Beath et al. 2013; Sierra Leone, Casey et al. 2013) and
either mixed or positive impacts on social welfare and on poverty reduction (Aceh, Sierra
Leone) and access to basic services (Wong 2012). These results are rather disappointing,
given that CDD/R programmes are ambitious and aim at initiating broad and long term
attitudinal and behavioural change of citizens and local leaders, which will improve social
cohesion, provide more inclusive forms of governance, and increase welfare provision (King
2013: 3f.). The evaluation findings have given rise to a number of general questions on the
validity of theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of CDD/R, the change hypothesis
that guides CDD/R programming, and even if CDD/R is at all able to address problems
of governance and social cohesion, and if so to what extent. The evaluation of the CDR
programme in Somalia will contribute to some of these questions.
In addition to the disappointing results of rigorous evaluations, theoretical and con-
ceptual concerns were raised that challenge general assumptions as well as the presumed
logic of change expressed in CDD/R projects.3 Accordingly, CDD/R approaches provide
the allure of optimism and purpose as they are embedded in a seductive mix of develop-
ment frames such as local ownership, empowerment or participation, which evoke moral
authority and display normative power (Cornwall and Brock 2005: 1045, 1043), but are
conceptually too vague to guide implementations. Instead, the concepts are interpreted,
(re-)defined and contested by people designing and implementing CDD/R programmes,
and by those who are receiving development projects. This process often leads to new
alliances between international and particular groups of local actors, and to elite capture
(Chopra and Hohe 2004; Chesterman 2007). The evaluation has thus assessed the mean-
ings and practices of community, participation and governance in Somali villages, in order
to assess if the proposed logic of change holds in the Somali context and, if necessary and
possible, to provide alternatives.
2 Induced participation is introduced and facilitated by a state or an external actor. Mansuri and Rao
(2013) pose it in opposition to organic participation which is mobilised or initialised by the social
groups independent of a government or any other external stimulus.
3 See among others Mohan and Stokke 2000; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2005; Reich
2006; Cornwall and Brock 2005, Cornwall 2008.
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1.3 Hogaan iyo Nabad (Governance and Peace)
Hogaan iyo Nabad (Hogaan) is funded by DFID (£4,519,723) and implemented by a con-
sortium of three international organisations: Care International (Care), Danish Refugee
Council (DRC) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). Programme activities in
the Somali villages were carried out from September 2013 until April 2015.4 Its main aim
is to support institutions of governance and governance capacity of local authorities and
citizens in 60 villages in Somaliland and Puntland. Local governance is defined broadly
as decision-making at village level, while the two main goals of governance are identified
as service delivery and conflict management (ToC Document, no date).
50 0 50 100 150 200 km
Figure 1: Location of the Hogaan Villages in Somaliland and Puntland
4 The evaluation fieldwork was conducted in November/December 2014 (qualitative); February/March
2015 (qualitative) and March/April (quantitative), thus while activities are still ongoing (cf. Caveat 1:
Timing of Evaluation).
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1.3.1 Problem Statement
Hogaan is concerned with local level governance. In line with recent academic litera-
ture on hybridity and, in particular, on hybrid forms of governance (Boege et al. 2008)5,
the Hogaan programme recognises the diversity of village institutions in Somaliland and
Puntland, and identifies co-operation between the formal (Village Council, Village Head-
man, Mayor) and traditional or customary institutions6 (elders, religious authorities) as
a critical precondition to both sustainable service delivery, and peace and security in the
village and beyond (ToC Document no date). The programme, however, identified two
main problems in the way local level governance is structured and practiced, and stated
that governance is 1) ineffective and 2) not inclusive. For the first problem (inefficiency)
the ToC identifies causes, while the second is merely described.
1. Local level governance is ineffective due to
1.1. Informal and non-bureaucratic practices of administration
1.1. Village institutions lack legal basis
1.2. Role confusion, role duplication and unclear responsibilities between Vil-
lage Council, clan elders and committee members
1.3. Limited links between village institutions, the District Council and the
Mayor, which again impacts on the effectiveness of local government.
1.2. Lack of capacity of local authorities
1.1. to effectively govern and manage conflicts, which in turn hampers decision-
making and service delivery
1.2. to lead development by assessing and managing communities’ needs
1.3. Lack of capacity of citizens
1.1. to demand services from the village authorities
1.2. to participate in decision-making
1.4. Lack of Resources
1.1. impedes service delivery; and
1.2. causes continued dependency on NGOs
2. Local level governance is not inclusive
Minority clans, women and youth
2.1. are not represented in village institutions
2.2. do not participate in decision-making
2.3. do not have their rights protected
Textbox 1 : Problem Statement (extracted from Theory of Change)
5 Since Boege et al (2008) introduced the concept of hybridity in their analysis of fragile or weak states,
it has gained popularity and is used to describe a broad spectrum of political orders.
6 The report prefers the term “customary” as it indicates that these rules and institutions are based on
everyday interactions and change with them, and often (but not necessarily) lack formal, bureaucratic
structures and legal anchorage.
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1.3.2 Theory of Change
Based on this problem statement, the programme has developed a Theory of Change
(ToC) which is centred around the core hypothesis that increased and more inclusive
citizen participation in decision-making and conflict management, and enhanced service
delivery by locally governing bodies, will lead to more effective, responsive and account-
able governance. The ToC outlines expectation of how a sequence of activities and outputs
will lead to two intended outcomes. It addresses questions of what, how and who, and thus
clarifies the main objectives (what), mechanisms (how) and addressees (who) of the pro-
gramme.
Main Objectives of Change (What): The ToC outlines two main outcomes of the
programme:
Outcome 1: Citizens’ participation in decision-making and conflict management is en-
hanced.
Outcome 2: Village-level institutions have improved their ability to plan, manage and
advocate for community priorities.
Under Outcome 1 a particular focus is given to inclusiveness and thus to the partici-
pation of groups that are traditionally excluded from politics (see Text Box 1: Problem
2), such as minorities, women and youth. Increased participation is also reflected in the
accessibility of the governing bodies by the citizens (albeit that this goal is specified in
the ToC under Outcome 2).
Under Outcome 2 Hogaan specifies that locally governing institutions will improve their
capacity in:
• Co-ordination and administration;
• Service delivery;
• Conflict management.
Local institutions have further increased their:
• Accessibility for citizens (responsiveness)7
The programme additionally intended to strengthen the links between village and higher
level governance at the district and regional level. While this goal was not separated in
the ToC, it was explicated in the problem statement.8
Main Mechanisms of Change (How): The ToC additionally outlines the mechanisms
used to address the identified problems. Mechanisms thus define the main assumptions
of how the intended change will be brought about. The programme followed a fairly
7 Albeit under Outcome 2 in the ToC, the evaluation findings on governance accessibility are outlined in
section 4.1
8 Although this goal was not included in the ToC, the evaluation has evaluated local authorities’ and
citizens’ views on the relation between village and district.
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standardized CDD/R process relying on the three core mechanisms commonly applied in
community-driven programming: 1. community entry and Community Action Planning
(CAP); 2. the delivery of block grants; and 3. capacity building and training.
Community entry and Community Action Planning (CAP) include a series
of initial village meetings (community entry) where the problems are explained and dis-
cussed, and ways to solve them are described. Villagers then select a committee (around
30 people) whose members co-operate with the Village Council to identify and to prioritise
main needs. However, in villages in which the VC was either dormant or not functional
at all, Hogaan encouraged the (re)building of formal institutional structures and advo-
cated for the inclusion of women in the council. The results of the needs prioritisation is
then again presented to a village meeting, to be discussed, challenged and revised until a
(majority) decision is reached.
The lack of resources (Problem 1.4 in Textbox 1) is addressed by the provision of
block grants.9 The international organisation provides two consecutive block grants (each
$17,000) for the realisation of development projects chosen by the villagers. A minimum
of 20% of each grant is provided by the villagers themselves in order to ensure seriousness
of needs identification and communal ownership of the project.
The lack of capacity of both villagers and local leaders (Problem 1.2 and 1.3 in
Textbox 1) is addressed by capacity building and training. This provides the core
mechanism for stimulating social change and accompanies every step of the CDR pro-
cesses on every impact level. In order to stimulate citizens’ participation in decision-
making, the programme for example provides training and capacity building, organises
dialogue forums and provides further support for citizens to play a more active role in
decision-making, to participate in collaborative discussions and to co-ordinate priorities
with government stakeholders. In particular, selected citizens10 and local government offi-
cials receive training in civic education, advocacy, conflict resolution and general support
for community dialogue and peace-building.11
In order to facilitate planning, management and community orientation at the village
level, training and support is provided for members of the Village Council and the devel-
opment committee in the provision of transparent, accountable and accessible services to
communities.12
However, besides training in specific topics and for selected groups of citizens or
members of locally governing bodies, capacity building included regular consultations
with and advice from members of the international organisation. Another crucial part
of CDD/Rs capacity-building was based on a learning-by-doing approach, for example
during community action planning and needs prioritisation, through the management of
the block grant and the implementation of the projects. The assumption was that com-
munity members who have gained planning, management and implementation practice
9 Block grants are also important part of organisation development and ’learning by doing’, as outlined
in the next section.
10The programme documents do not outline the criteria for the selection of training participants.
11The Theory of Change outlines precisely: IF Community members are provided with training and
supported to play a more active role in public decision-making, co-ordinate priorities with government
stakeholders and participate in collaborative discussions about local development, AND selected com-
munity members and local government officials in GPC target areas are trained in civic education,
advocacy or conflict resolution in support of community dialogue and peace-building efforts, THEN
citizens participate in decision-making and conflict mitigation.
12Again the ToC states IF village and district council members in GPC target areas are trained and
supported to provide transparent, accountable and accessible services to communities THEN village
level institutions are able to plan, manage and advocate for community priorities.
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will continue to manage projects in a similar manner, but without being dependent on
either the central government or an international organisation.
Main addressees (Who): The ToC refers to community members and local govern-
ment officials, the latter specified as selected village and district council members (ToC
Document, no date). The general claim that CDR programmes challenge existing struc-
tures of authority by putting power and resources in the hands of community members
(Fearon et al. 2008: 1) does thus not apply to the Hogaan programme. Hogaan was imple-
mented in districts where the control of the state over local resources was either weak or
completely absent, and where governance was radically localised (organised by citizens),
thus resulting in the complex mix of self-governing institutions that today characterise
most parts of Somalia and at least remoter places in Somaliland.13 Hogaan did thus not
so much challenge local structures as work through them and with them, in an attempt
to formalise and if necessary build-up these structures, and to link them more closely to
the district government and hence the state. Its second focus was on the intersection of
government and society. Like other CDR programmes, Hogaan aimed at empowering cit-
izens in general and disadvantaged groups in particular, by providing avenues to increase
interaction between citizens and locally governing institutions and officials, by including
villagers in decision-making processes and by empowering them to articulate demands.
13Literature on the organisation of governance in Somalia/Somaliland includes Menkhaus, Bakonyi.
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Chapter 2
Evaluation Design and Implementation
This chapter sets out the main evaluation design, and outlines the evaluation’s main ob-
jectives and methods used to achieve its objectives (section 2.1). It also explains why and
how the evaluation diverted from an originally proposed design and analysis plan, and
discusses challenges of this diversion and how they were mitigated. The sampling meth-
ods and details about the two surveys conducted are outlined in (section 2.2), followed
by information on the implementation of both the qualitative and quantitative research
component (section 2.3). Given that little solid information is available on the social com-
position and structure of Somali villages, a proper randomisation of the household sample
proved challenging. The evaluation therefore conducted two sampling experiments, aimed
at shedding light on which techniques allow for a proper randomisation of the sample,
especially in contexts where little general information is available. The chapter ends with
the presentation and discussion of the results of these experiments (section 2.4).
2.1 Research Design
The evaluation uses a mixed-method design to contribute to three core objectives (O).
O1: To unpack some of the concepts and assumptions underlying community-based ap-
proaches and change hypotheses.
O2: To measure if the programme has led to the intended outcomes that is if it has
increased citizens’ participation in decision-making and conflict management, and
strengthened the ability of village-level institutions to plan, manage and advocate
for community priorities.
Based on the findings of O1 and O2:
O3: To provide conjectures about causal mechanisms that may lead to social change and
to develop an alternative theory of change.
Under O1, as a point of departure for the evaluation, and with the aim to operationalize
and if necessary refine the concepts that underlie the programme’s Theory of Change,
rapid ethnographic assessments based on semi-standardised interviews and focus group
discussions were conducted, in three implementation villages and one comparison (non-
implementation) village per district. The qualitative research component focused on social
relations, practices and meanings that structure concepts of community, participation and
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community contribution; it additionally examined membership and relations within and
between formal and customary governing institutions at the village level. In order to ad-
dress O2, two surveys were conducted. They were guided by the question of whether the
programme caused the changes anticipated. Villages in which Hogaan was implemented
(implementation villages) were compared to villages where the programme was not im-
plemented (non-implementation villages).This allows the evaluation to assess what would
have happened if the programme had not taken place and thus the change induced by the
Hogaan programme.1 The non-implementation villages were not randomly selected before
the programme was implemented (as would be the case with a Randomized Controlled
Trial). Instead they were selected in the course of the evaluation after the programme was
already implemented. Regression methods were used to control for systematic differences
between the implementation (Hogaan) and non-implementation villages.
Caveat 1: Timing of the Evaluation
Ideally an endline survey should be implemented a while after a programme is finalised.
The final evaluation of the Hogaan programme was, however, conducted while programme
activities were ongoing. This has serious implications, as the findings do not determine
sustainability and long term change, but rather measure effects that are directly pro-
duced by the programme. It is thus not possible to assess if the measured perception and
governance effects are routinized and therefore likely to last.
Caveat 2: Change in the Initial Evaluation Strategy
The research design outlined above represents a change from the original design that
was set out in the evaluation proposal and subsequently outlined in the data analysis
plan. Following the evaluation Terms of Reference (TOR), a pre-post evaluation design
was designed to achieve O2. Using a baseline survey the programme had conducted, the
original design aimed to look at changes that had taken place in the course of delivering
the programme. The evaluation, however, recognised that pre-post evaluations provide a
less robust measure than alternatives, particularly Randomized Control Trials (RCTs).
However, a feasibility study ruled out the possibility of an RCT for the Hogaan programme
(Grant et al. 2013), hence a pre-post evaluation design was requested whilst recommending
that results were interpreted with caution.
The pre-post research design made comparability with the baseline survey an overrid-
ing necessity, and considerable effort was put into making the endline data as comparable
as possible with the baseline data (see for example Section 2.2 below on sampling). For
this reason the main body of the endline survey followed the baseline survey as closely as
possible. Additional modules were added to test some of the findings of the qualitative
research, and to assess the impact of programme activities. A leadership survey was de-
signed to enable the testing of the aspects of the theory of change relating to leadership.
A small-scale comparison with six non-implementation villages was included in the initial
design as a ‘sanity check’.
Despite this, the evaluation presented here depends almost entirely on comparison
with non-implementation villages. A comparison with the baseline data had to be dropped
when the baseline data was shown to be at least partly unreliable. Large data entry er-
rors were discovered only relatively late, after the endline data was already collected and
1 Non-implementation villages are thus used as the basis for a model of a counterfactual.
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an initial comparison between baseline and endline data identified implausible patterns.
After further investigation, implausible data was also found in the paper copies of the
baseline survey. These problems came on the back of a number of additional difficulties
with the interpretation of the baseline. Amongst these were difficulties caused by the
change of evaluator teams from the baseline and endline evaluation. Although the base-
line evaluation set out criteria for an endline assessment, the assumptions or hypotheses
that underlined some of the baseline survey questions were not completely clear to the
endline evaluation team. Additionally, parts of the baseline were conducted while the
programme, and in particular community action planning (CAP), was already ongoing.
Instead of providing baseline data, that is information on the situation in the villages
before the programme was implemented, the baseline already measured implementation
effects. At the same time as the baseline data proved particularly problematic, the iden-
tification of non-implementation villages proved successful. In line with the growing re-
alisation of baseline data errors, the decision was taken to extend the survey to further
non-implementation villages and to make the comparison between implementation and
non-implementation villages the basis of the evaluation.
Non-implementation Villages
One reason for the rejection of an RCT for the evaluation of the Hogaan programme
was the difficulty of identifying control villages (Grant et al. 2013). Very little systematic
information on Somali villages is available, including even basic information on the num-
ber of villages in the different districts or the exact district boundaries, let alone other
characteristics such as approximate village size, security situation and accessibility (with
respect to conflict), social structure and composition of villages etc. Compared to Eri-
gabo in Somaliland, the districts in Puntland are quite small, and district borders were
redesigned in both Somaliland and Puntland while the Hogaan programme was imple-
mented. For some villages it was thus not fully clear to which district they belonged;
others changed their status to district capitals and thus experienced fundamental changes
in the course of the project period, with the central appointment of the District Commis-
sioner and the reshuffling of the Village to a District Council. The selection of comparison
villages (non-implementation villages) thus faces some challenges, in particular unclear
district boundaries and the possibility of there being no untreated village of the minimum
size available as comparison. The turbulent political developments and internationally
sponsored attempts to re-build state structures in both Somaliland and Puntland makes
estimates of treatment effects rather noisy. The evaluation findings are therefore not as
robust as a large scale RCT would be. Nevertheless, the findings of the evaluations do
provide evidence of impact.
In the absence of any systematic village information, advice from local experts and
residents on village composition and selection was taken, and the survey extended to eight
further non-implementation villages in Galkayo (North) and Erigabo. Due to heavy rains,
Burtinle could not be included in the extension, as most villages were not accessible.
However remaining villages in Burtinle did anyway not match the selection criteria, espe-
cially the criteria of minimum size. There are development programmes on-going in most
villages in Puntland and Somaliland (including non-Hogaan programmes in many of the
Hogaan villages).2 The following Table 2.1 compares both village types with respect to
2 For example, in Erigabo there were CARE programmes on-going in five of the non-implementation
villages. The GPC team suggested there was particularly pronounced possibility of programme spillover
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years of residence of survey respondents, livestock ownership, clan diversity, average HH
size and poverty levels, to determine comparability. Urban areas were separated because
they differ in many significant measures. The comparison shows that the only signifi-
cant difference between implementation (Hoogaan) and non-implementation villages is
the clan composition. Implementation villages were more clan homogeneous than villages
participating in the Hogaan programme.
hogaan hogaan non- sig. diff. villages
urban village implementation (hogaan v. non-imp)
av. residence (yrs) 16.44 13.76 13.01 none
hh with livestock % 0.29 0.61 0.62 none
clan diversity 1.32 0.97 0.60 ∗∗∗
av. hh size (people) 7.69 6.11 6.27 none
extreme poor % 0.47 0.48 0.49 none
permanent roof % 0.90 0.68 0.69 none
Table 2.1: Comparison of Implementation and Non-implementation Villages
The three following tables 2.2 to 2.4 provide further details on the villages in each district.
The villages in which surveys were conducted are listed alphabetically, but first the im-
plementation (Hogaan) villages and then non-implementation (non-imp) villages (Type).
The table also indicates the number (N) of Households (HH) and leadership (Lead) ques-
tionnaires collected in each village and gives an estimate of household (HH) size of each
village.3
on the question of VC meeting attendance in Erigabo as other CARE programmes had taken to
working through VC rather than programme specific committees as a result of the perceived sucess of
Hogaan programme. However, the data does not suggest that the CARE processes in Erigabo led to
a substantial increase in participation in VC meetings. On the contrary higher VC participation was
found in the non-implementation villages in Galkayo: Erigabo: Hogaan 79%/Non-impl 79% Galkayo:
Hogaan 78%/Non-impl 83%
3 Household size in the table is based on estimates by the supervisors of the survey teams. Table 5.1 in
Chapter 5 provides another table in which household estimates based on programme documents, on
the satellite images and on supervisors are compared. We use here and in the following the supervisors’
estimates, not because we think they are more accurate, but because they provide estimates for all
villages.
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Village Type N (HH) N (lead) HH Size
Bahaley Hogaan 22 5 40
Ballidacar Hogaan 27 5 55
Birrecaad Hogaan 11 5 30
Birta Dheer Hogaan 24 4 50
B. Town (Hawlwadag) Hogaan 29 5 530
B. Town (Horumar) Hogaan 29 5 550
B. Town (Israac) Hogaan 28 5 530
B. Town (Wadajir) Hogaan 27 5 580
Faratooyo Hogaan 24 5 60
Farjano Hogaan 25 5 33
Godobyar Hogaan 25 5 62
Hayanle Hogaan 15 5 45
Jalam Hogaan 29 5 5000
Kalabayr Hogaan 21 6 900
Koryal Hogaan 17 5 40
Lacle Hogaan 10 5 25
Maga’ley Hogaan 29 5 70
Megag Hogaan 29 5 54
Meygagle Hogaan 28 5 60
Xaarxaar Hogaan 20 5 50
Awrculus non-imp 26 5 40
Meeraysane non-imp 5 10
Table 2.2: Villages in (Matched) District Burtinle
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Village Type N (HH) N (lead) HH Size
Adaygebagebo Hogaan 2 3 3
Agaran Hogaan 29 5 200
Badweyn Hogaan 25 5 5000
Balanbal Hogaan 4 75
Balisbule Hogaan 27 5 500
Bayra Hogaan 29 5 300
Beer dhagaxtuur Hogaan 23 4 50
Bilcil Hogaan 19 5 20
Bursaalax Hogaan 26 5 1500
Darusalam Hogaan 21 5 25
Dhagaxyo Cado Hogaan 26 4 30
G. City (Hormar4) Hogaan 4 1000
G. City (Israc) Hogaan 26 5 800
G. City (X/Garsoor) Hogaan 31 8 1000
Harfo Hogaan 32 5 3000
Malaasle Hogaan 26 5 60
Qalanqal Hogaan 27 6 45
Roox Hogaan 26 5 50
Sallah Hogaan 30 5 320
Dhobocantug non-imp 19 5 100
Elbardale non-imp 12 4 20
Gosol non-imp 24 5 45
Labilamane non-imp 18 5 120
Mayle non-imp 18 5 200
Shakaal non-imp 17 5 50
Table 2.3: Villages in (Matched) District Galkayo
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Village Type N (HH) N (lead) HH Size
Ardaa Hogaan 25 4 35
Biyoguduud Hogaan 17 5 30
Buq Hogaan 25 5 30
Carmala Hogaan 27 5 450
Damal Hagare Hogaan 30 5 200
Daryle Hogaan 8 3 50
Dibqarax Hogaan 7 2 24
E. Town (Daya’an) Hogaan 30 5 150
E. Town (Hafad Somale) Hogaan 33 5 150
E. Town (Shacab) Hogaan 27 4 200
Godcaanood Hogaan 26 5 120
Godmobias Hogaan 30 3 400
Goof Hogaan 24 4 50
Jidali Hogaan 23 5 40
Mait Hogaan 30 4 400
Rugey Hogaan 20 5 50
Shimbirale Hogaan 31 5 100
Sibaayo Hogaan 10 5 25
Yube Hogaan 23 5 500
Yufle Hogaan 36 4 150
Darasalam non-imp 16 5 200
Fadhigaab non-imp 18 4 250
Gar-Adag non-imp 18 5 2000
Midhisho non-imp 22 4 25
Xiingalool non-imp 18 5 3000
Xiis non-imp 2 4 10
Table 2.4: Villages in (Matched) District Erigabo
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Impact of Design Change and Mitigation
The necessary change of the evaluation approach has had a detrimental effect, although
every effort has been made to minimize it. Due to the late change in the evaluation
character, the data analysis plan had to be discarded. Additionally, the evaluation team
would have chosen a larger size of the non-implementation village sample had this research
strategy been designed from the outset. This is particularly a problem for the study of
anything other than very large interaction effects.
At the same time, the change in evaluation design had only limited effects on the
overall quality of the evaluation. The dropping of the data analysis plan carries the risk
that results are cherry-picked. In order to address this issue we use a standard model for
all our analyses, and systematically report all our findings relating to a standard set of
dependent variables. The overall pattern of results is therefore fully transparent in the
report. With respect to the robustness of the conclusions, both pre-post and non-random
non-implementation villages are less robust than an RCT for making causal inferences.
Non-implementation village comparisons however may even provide a better basis for a
comparison in situations of rapidly changing contexts. If the selection of reasonable non-
implementation villages had been deemed possible at the outset of the evaluation, this is
very likely the approach which would have been chosen. Therefore, the unavoidable late
change in the analytical strategy may well have had overall positive consequences for the
evaluation.
2.2 Sampling Techniques
2.2.1 Qualitative Sampling
As the qualitative study followed the aim to capture a broad range of citizens’ views on
general concepts of community, participation and governance, selection of villages was
based on maximizing variation of the following criteria: clan composition (homogene-
ity/heterogeneity; minority clan representation); size of the village (fewer/larger number
of households); accessibility (distance from urban centres and type of road) and project
composition (type and contribution). In Erigabo, the criterion of clan affiliation gained
importance to ensure that the views of the four major clans in the district (Isaaq/Habar
Yonis and Isaaq/Habar Jeclo, Darood/Dulbahante and Darood/Warsangeli) are captured.
The selection of villages was constrained by security restrictions for international staff.
While all villages were accessible in Burtinle district, the requirement to take a hotel in
Garowe and to travel forth and back every day, made the selection of remote villages
impossible. Villages in Galkayco were not accessible at all for international staff and,
due to ongoing conflicts, two villages were also off limits for national staff. Two national
researchers were trained in Burtinle and collected the data in Galkayo. In Erigabo, only
13 villages (including the 3 urban quarters in Ergibao) could be selected due to Care
International’s security protocol for international staff.
2.2.2 Survey Sampling
The evaluation aimed to survey a representative sample of the village population, which
would also be directly comparable to the results from the baseline survey.
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Insufficient details on the precise conduct of the baseline led to the decision to develop
two survey experiments that would enable the evaluation to generate comparable data,
but simultaneously to assess the extent to which the survey results were influenced by
sampling methods. The first experiment is related to the selection of households, the
second to the within household selection of the interviewee.
Household Selection Experiment
In the design phase, a variation on EPI sampling methods were proposed. EPI sampling4 is
a standard method used to find random samples when there is no sampling frame available.
EPI and other random-walk methods work by selecting a random initial household, and
then randomly selecting further households from that starting point until a fixed number
of households have been interviewed. The specific proposal was that an initial household
was selected by taking a starting point near to the village centre then selecting a random
direction by spinning a pen to indicate a direction and finding the closest household to the
point in that direction half way to the village periphery. Subsequent households would then
be selected by choosing the closest house in a random direction from the current location
(again using pen spinning to determine direction). Reasonable concerns were raised in the
design phase about the proposed EPI sampling techniques (almost certainly used in the
baseline) as it is well known that such methods under-represent the periphery of villages,
where it was believed that minority and poorer population may more frequently live.
In order to address this, the evaluation randomly selected half of the villages and
undertook sampling in those places using satellite images. In order to ensure comparabil-
ity with the baseline, 25 implementation villages (50% of the sample of implementation
villages) were randomly selected for the satellite image approach while the remaining 25
used EPI-like methods. In the villages randomly selected for satellite image sampling, a
map of the village was created using QGIS and satellite images primarily from Bing Areal.
Conditional on size, the villages were divided into geographical clusters of approximately
equal size and about twenty households (using the tcluster package in R). Within clus-
ters, households were randomly sampled for the interviews. In all, 550 A3 maps were
created for the enumerators. These maps, as illustrated by the examples in Figure 2, show
both the location of the cluster within the village (on one side of the A3 map), and the
precise location of the randomly selected households (on the other side of the map). Each
enumerator is allocated a cluster within the village, and they were told to visit the first six
locations in the cluster (according to the numbers of the map). A protocol for attempting
to locate the inhabitants of empty houses was given, but in case that this did not yield
an interview, or that the building was not an inhabited location, enumerators were told
to replace with other locations in the cluster in strict numerical order. The number of
interviews conducted in each village is shown in tables 2.2-2.4.
4 EPI Sampling was first developed by the World Health Organisation for its Expanded Programme on
Immunization, thus EPI.
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Figure 2: Example Village and Cluster Sampling Maps
Within Household Selection Experiment
There were concerns about the practice of interviewing the person who answered the door
in each household, but these were mitigated by the development of a household roster
which allowed the randomisation of the interviewee. To ensure comparability with the
baseline whilst still addressing concerns about representativeness, the door openers were
sampled in some households and individuals randomly selected from the household roster
in other households.
The results of both sampling experiments, that is mapping versus EPI sampling, and
randomised selection from household roster versus questioning the door opener, are pre-
sented in Section 2.5
2.3 The Surveys
As the addressees of the programme were divided into citizens and local leaders, and
training and capacity-building was provided to both groups, the evaluation designed two
surveys: an endline household survey and a local leadership survey. This enables the
evaluation to differentiate programme effects on citizens from effects on local leaders.
2.3.1 The Household Survey
The endline household survey was designed to replicate the questions posed in the baseline
survey. However, two modules were added. The ToC identified training and capacity
building as core mechanism for initiating change. One module was added to evaluate
participation of respondents in the implementation villages asking how they perceived
the quality of training and capacity-building activities and, more generally, the imple-
mentation of the programme. This module is mainly used to draw inferences of direct
programme effects, as people who have, for example, participated in training are sup-
posed to answer some questions differently to people who have not received the same
training.
As a result of the findings from the qualitative research, a module on community
contributions was added to the survey. Moral obligations to contributions, and thus
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mutual dependencies of villagers, were emphasized as a constitutive element of communi-
ties and as a factor that facilitates social cohesion. The module on contributions aims at
a further understanding of contribution practices, and is used to evaluate the impact of
(different types of) contributions on village level planning and governance.
Further questions on clan affiliation, and membership in local organisations
(such as youth groups, women’s groups, NGOs) were added to the survey to capture if and
how clan affiliation and membership in organisations influences perceptions and practices
of communal relations, village level governance and community-based development, and
if certain affiliations provide or block opportunities for participation.
In order to further examine the impact of the programme, a discrete choice sur-
vey experiment was added. The GPC programme seeks to raise awareness on inclu-
sive participatory approaches towards governance, to foster inclusive decision-making and
to clarify roles of the different governing bodies at village level. However, international
projects also provide substantial financial assistance. One long-standing concern is that
the entire structure of responses is driven by anticipated future support. Villagers may
well give answers that they believe international actors want to hear, answers that hence
reflect the preference for the continued international assistance. Villagers may also hide
what they believe are internationally undesirable responses.
The endline household survey was composed of ten modules: background, personal
and household details; Hogaan engagement; survey experiment; community contributions;
rights and rights prioritisation; institutional roles and responsibilities; participation and
interaction with leaders; conflict resolution; governance, service provision and identities.
The implementation of the survey took an average of 30 minutes.
2.3.2 Leadership Survey
The leadership survey consisted of nine modules: background and personal details; lead-
ership roles; conflict resolutions; right and rights prioritisation; Hogaan training; insti-
tutional roles and rights; governance; survey experiment and identities. The questions
were designed to enable a comparison between implementation and non-implementation
villages, to understand the impacts of specific forms of participation in the Hogaan pro-
gramme on attitudes towards leadership and to compare leadership and citizens attitudes
on governance. The implementation of the survey took approximately 15 minutes.
2.4 Evaluation Implementation
The qualitative research was conducted from 16 November to 6 December 2014 in
Puntland and from 18 February to 2 March 2015 in Somaliland. The second team build
on lessons learnt from the first sequence. In total, 79 Key Informant Interviews (KII) and
47 Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted.5 Findings from this research stream
fed into Objective 2. They provided a starting point for descriptive inference and the
examination of how the GPC programme has affected community relations and power
dynamics at the village level, and if change initiated by the programme followed the
pathway outlined in the programme’s Theory of Change (cf. Alternative ToC, Chapter
5).
5 Divided among the districts, 29 KII and 15 FGD were conducted in N/Galkayo; 21 KII and 17 FGD
in Burtinle; and 29 KII and 15 FGD in Erigabo.
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The quantitative research started on 16 March 2015 with training (3 days) for
enumerators in Hargeysa. Three teams, each comprising five enumerators and headed
by one supervisor, implemented the survey in the three districts. Data collection took
between 28 (Erigabo) and 30 days (Burtinle and N/Galkayo). Mobile data collection tools
on tablets and based on a freeware Open Data Kit (ODK) platform were used. Data was
transmitted from the field back to the research team via the internet using a secure ODK
Aggregate server by the supervisor, whenever the field team had access to the internet.
The household and the leadership survey were implemented in 57 of 60 programme
villages and in 13 non-implementation villages. Three implementation villages were not
accessible for the team, one of them because local authorities insisted that interviews are
conducted in their presence and additionally refused the utilisation of tablets6, the two
others because of internal conflicts. In all, the evaluators collected 1604 household and
347 leadership interviews in 70 villages.
2.5 Sample: Description and Results of Experiments
2.5.1 Satellite Image versus EPI sampling
As outlined in Section 2.2.2 the evaluation experimented with the utilisation of satellite
images and aimed at testing if they provide a feasible alternative to standard EPI sampling
techniques. 50% of implementation villages were randomly selected for the satellite image
approach. However, as the mapping technique used was relative time consuming, the
evaluation decided to exclude mapping of urban areas. Additionally the evaluation was
unable to identify the exact location and thus to map one of the randomly selected villages.
In total, as part of experiment the evaluation mapped 24 villages and used standard EPI
sampling technique in 26 (excluding non-implementation villages and urban areas).
2.5.2 Experiment Result
The evaluation did not find evidence that the utilisation of satellite images changed the
representation of the village periphery and thus of minority households or poorer popula-
tions. There are no significant differences with respect to mapped and unmapped villages
on any of the following measures:
1. Household location with respect to village periphery (as classified by the enumera-
tor)
2. Indicators that are likely to be connected to location such as
• size of house
• roof type of house
• wealth
However, the evaluation found provisional evidence that sampling by maps led to an
increase in sampling of members with minority clan (note: not caste!) background. In
6 While the team carried a paper version of the survey and could have diverted to it, the rejection of
anonymity was not acceptable.
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mapped villages, a significantly larger number of householders with minority clan back-
ground were sampled (** with clustered standard errors).7 The result, however, should be
considered provisional because (a) the main mechanism by which we expected this result,
that is by including the periphery, does not appear to have been a factor; (b) the experi-
ment was conducted on a fairly small scale (50 villages); and (c) alternative mechanisms
or the robustness of the result against alternative specifications of the minority/majority
clan specifications should be checked before final conclusions are drawn.
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Figure 3: Mapping vs EPI Sampling Effect
The evaluation team would point to two auxiliary advantages and one disadvantage of
producing and using maps:
Advantage
7 This result also holds under an intent to treat analysis, in which the evaluation compares those villages
that were originally intended to be mapped, including those which were not actually mapped, with
those where there was no intention to map.
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• Mapping and maps helped to understand the size, structure and potential household
composition (size and wealth of households, shops) of the villages. It also raised
concerns about the size of some villages, which were significantly under the minimum
size for projects identified by Hogaan (70 households).
• Maps served as an important tool in the training of enumerators. First, enumerators
started to think about village structure themselves. While conducting the training
in the outskirts of Hargeysa, for example, enumerators did exclude IDP huts with
the argument that IDPs are not part of the community. The maps helped to explain
that everybody living in the village, independent of status, wealth, duration of res-
idence etc. qualifies as interview partner.
Disadvantage
• The production of maps is time consuming and expensive. The latter is especially
relevant if contemporary maps need to be produced. Publicly available images are
often a number of years out of date whilst access to real-time or contemporary
images is relatively expensive.
2.5.3 Within Household Randomisation
Figure 4 shows the results of the within household randomisation procedure. Each graph
relates to a different demographic characteristic. The first bar shows the proportion with
that characteristic amongst door-openers; the second bar shows the proportion when using
within household randomization. The third bar refers to the proportion of the character-
istic within the whole population (on basis of the household roster). For a representative
sample of the population the samples should approximate to the population proportions
(thus should approximate the third graph).
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Figure 4: Household Randomisation Effect
The results show that sampling door-openers will lead to an oversampling of:
• women (∗∗∗)
• older ages groups (∗∗∗)
• those with no formal education (∗)
and an undersampling of:
• grown-up children of the head of household (∗∗∗)
Figure 4 shows that within household randomization obtains results which are generally
much closer to the patterns found in the household roster. Nevertheless, even the random
selection of household members does not fully represent the household roster itself. This
is not because our random sample was ‘unlucky’, but a result of the multi-stage sampling
procedures that are almost always used in survey research. The key stage here is the
selection of households followed by the selection of one individual within that household.
In cases where characteristics are correlated with household size relative to the population,
this approach produces ‘unbalanced’ results, as can most obviously be demonstrated in the
case of a high number of adult children. If we consider household size simply in terms of the
number of adults eligible for interviews, very large households tend to be those with large
number of children living there. Hence, grown-up children have a systematically lower
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probability of being selected for interviews even if their household has been selected.
In Puntland and Somaliland a large number of demographic characteristics appear to
be correlated with household size, and hence even within household randomization will
produce samples which are not representative of the population as a whole.
These results show that the bias that results from interviewing only door-openers
is likely to be substantial and needs to be systematically addressed. The use of within
household randomization is able to correct many but not all of these biases. The data
collected from the experiment will enable us to examine the extent to which model-based
corrections can be used to rebalance the data. However this analysis has not yet been
conducted.
2.6 Statistical Methods
The main body of the evaluation compares response patterns in implementation villages
with responses in non-implementation villages, in order to establish effects of the Hogaan
programme on participation practices, inclusiveness of decision-making and governance
performance.
The Hogaan programme has a multi-level structure. The programme aims to have
an impact on individuals who live in villages that form districts. When we interview
citizens across the 60 implementation villages, we gather information from more than
1,000 independent individuals, but also from 60 clusters of individuals living in the same
village, which are again grouped together into three more or less closely related groups
(districts) and these again attached to two (sub-)states. The statistical analysis of this kind
of data requires either clustered standard errors or multi-level modelling. The evaluation
chose to use multi-level modelling because it provides additional estimates of substantive
parameters, here in particular the modelling of village and district effects.
In order to keep the analysis transparent, a common set of independent variables is
used in all the models. These independent variables are:
Individual level: age group [18-24, 25-34, 35-54, 55+], gender [male, female], clan [ma-
jority clan, minority clan, occupational caste]
Village level: type [city/town, village], clan diversity (Shannon diversity measure of
sub-clans in the village), comparison status [implementation, non-implementation
village]
The analysis on which the evaluation rests uses on multi-levels models. To ease interpreta-
tion of the results, the findings are presented in a simplified form. Rather than presenting
regression coefficients, the results of the multi-level models are presented as effect sizes
that is the expected change in the dependent variable due to a change in the category of
one particular independent variable (usually the difference between implementation and
non-implementation villages). The effect size errors are estimated across 1,000 draws of
the model parameters. The effect size estimates appear in the subsequent chapters as
simple percentages.
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Chapter 3
Evaluation Findings
The presentation of findings in the report is structured by the question of whether the
Hogaan programme has reached its main objectives from the viewpoint of the citizens. The
answers of respondents in Hogaan villages are compared with answers of respondents from
non-implementation villages in order to determine if Hogaan villages are more effectively
governed and if governance is more inclusive than in villages which have not received
the programme. Those findings of the qualitative evaluation component that provide
additional background information against which the survey results can be interpreted,
will be introduced in the findings. Others will be presented in the final chapter as they were
used to develop recommendations for further programming (see chapter 5) in conjunction
with survey results.1
The chapters are structured in accordance with the main outcomes identified in the
ToC. The first section (3.1) addresses participation and assesses whether Hogaan has
enhanced villagers’ participation in decision-making, and if the governing bodies have
indeed become more accessible for villagers and increased their responsiveness towards
citizens’ needs. The findings on Hogaan’s impact on the capacity of village-level institu-
tions are presented in the second section (3.2). In particular, it addresses the question of
whether capacities to govern have improved with respect to Co-ordination and Adminis-
tration (3.2.1); Service Delivery (3.2.2); and Conflict Management (3.2.3). It also examines
whether Hogaan has more generally impacted on citizens’ trust in local governance (3.2.4).
The results of a survey experiment that aimed to determine villagers’ governance prefer-
ences with respect to development (3.3) and the effects of trainings (3.4) are presented
in the final section. While each section ends with a brief conclusion, a summary of all
findings will be presented in the next chapter (4).
Presentation of Results: How to read the graphs
The results of the survey are shown in a series of parallel graphs. The graphs also show
if there are statistically significant differences in the answers to questions, for example
if there are differences between implementation and non-implementation villages. The
graphs show effect sizes of regressions, but can be read as showing percentages.
1 Qualitative findings were partly used to operationalise survey questions. However, the survey design
was in this respect quite restricted by the requirement to conduct a pre-post comparison. It could thus
only expand the survey but not significantly alter existing modules.
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A very quick overview
Each set of graphs answers a question. Usually the question is something like: Did the
Hogaan Programme Make a Difference? The answers are colour-coded in the right-hand
graph:
• Green: Hogaan led to a measurement increase
• Grey: No evidence Hogaan made a difference
• Red: Hogaan led to a measurement decrease
Just looking at the colours means that the headline message from the graph can be seen
very quickly.
An only slightly less quick overview
The numbers on the graphs can also be read. When there are two graphs, they are
normally comparing Hogaan and non-implementation responses to a question like ‘should
the VC provide social services?’ The numbers on the right hand graph indicate how big
the differences were (for example 14% more people think so in Hogaan villages), and the
numbers on the left hand graph give the baseline percentages (for example 44% in Hogaan
against 30% in non-implmentation villages).
When there are three graphs this address a question like has the gap between youth and
older people in participation changed with the programme. The right hand graph shows
difference in the gap between youth and older people in Hogaan and non-implementation
villages (eg the the gap between youth and older people participation is 13% more in non-
implementation than Hogaan villages). The middle graph shows the gaps in the different
villages types (eg participation is the same in Hogaan villages, and 13% lower for youth
in non-implementation villages) and the left-hand graph gives the baseline percentages
(eg 16% participation for both youth and older people in Hogaan villages and in non-
implementation villages 6% for youth and 19% for older people).
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Figure 5: Institutions Providing Social Services: Comparison Village Type
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In the two parallel graphs, the left-hand graph shows percentages (with a 90% confidence
interval) and the right-hand graph shows the difference in percentages (with a 90% con-
fidence interval). For example the four graphs in Figure 5 relate to the question of which
institutions should provide social services. The top graph, entitled ’Elders: Social Services’
represents those who answered that elders should provide social services. The top line in
the left hand graph shows the most likely estimate for the percentage of respondents in
implementation (Hogaan) villages who think that elders should provide social services.
The percentage is 20%, but has a 90% confidence interval spanning from 14-26%. The
bottom line provides the same information for the non-implementation villages, in this
case estimated at 18% (with a 90% confidence interval spanning the range 11-25%). The
right hand graph addresses the question of whether there is a significant difference be-
tween the figures in the left hand graph for the implementation (Hogaan) villages and
the non-implementation villages. Of course on average the difference between the imple-
mentation estimate of 20 and the non-implementation estimate of 18 is 2. However, the
confidence interval of the difference spans the range from -5 to 8. Because this confidence
interval includes zero, the difference between the implementation and non-implementation
villages is not statistically significant. The second figure provides the same information
for the question of whether the Village Council should provide social services. In this
case 44% (33-53%) of implementation respondents compared to 30% (21-40%) of non-
implementation respondents think so. The difference of 14% has a confidence interval
from 6-21% which does not include zero, hence the difference is statistically significant.
To assist with the recognition of overall patterns we have colour-coded the significance
of responses. Positive significant responses (where implementation respondents are higher
than non-implementation respondents) are coloured green, non-significant responses are
coloured grey and negative significant responses (where implementation respondents are
lower than non-implementation respondents) are coloured red. The number of stars in
the left hand figure indicate the level of statistical significance, ∗ indicates significance
at the 90% level (p < .1), ∗∗ indicates significance at the 95% level (p < .05), and ∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 99% level (p < .01). Cases where the differences we find are
not statistically significant (p > .01) are described as null results. A null result means
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the cases. Note that
not being able to reject the null hypothesis is not the same as demonstrating that there
actually is no difference between the cases. Other figures include three parallel running
graphs, such as for example:
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Figure 6: Participation: Comparison Youth Groups
In the above presented three parallel graphs, the left-hand graph shows percentages, the
middle graph shows the difference of percentage and the right-hand graph shows the dif-
ference in the differences. These comparisons are largely used to examine questions about
inclusion. The Hogaan programme might have had an impact on inclusion without bring-
ing about full equality. Figure 6 addresses youth inclusion on the question of whether the
26
individual has made a request of local government. The left hand figure give the percent-
ages of youth (16% with CI 13-19%) and adults (16% with CI 13-19%) in implementation
villages in the top two lines, and the percentages of youths (6%, 90% CI 3-11%) and
adults (19% CI 13-26%) in non-implementation villages in the bottom two lines. The
middle graph addresses the question of whether there is a difference between youths and
adults in implementation villages and non-implementation villages. The top line relates
to the implementation villages, where there is no significant difference, indeed the point
estimate of the difference is 0% (-4,+4%). The bottom line relates to non-implementation
villages where youths are about 13% (-20 to -6%) less likely to have made a request, which
is a statistically significant negative difference at the 99% level. The third parallel graph
addresses the key question from the point of view of the evaluation of whether there is
a significant difference in these differences. The point estimate of the difference in the
differences is 13%, with a confidence interval from 5% to 21% which does not include 0.
Hence there is a statistically significant difference in youth inclusion on having made a
request of local government.
3.1 Participation (Outcome 1)
Given the increasing importance of participatory approaches to development since the
1980s, there is an enormous body of literature available, including empirically driven
studies on the challenges of participation more generally and in development in particu-
lar.2 Most of these studies emphasise that participation comprises a broad range different
activities ranging from mobilizing people, to attending meetings, discussing ideas, sharing
information, consulting, organising self-help groups or making joint decision. In CDD/R,
participation is frequently connected to inclusiveness and thus implies that those most af-
fected by the proposed intervention are included in decision-making. However, the form of
this inclusion can again range from nominal and passive participation (that is mere mem-
bership in a group or being informed of decisions), to consultative participation (where
one is at least consulted and requested to raise an opinion although without any guar-
antee that the opinion is considered in the decision-making), to interactive participation
(which refers to having voice and power to influence decisions) (Agraval 2001: 1624f.).
Participation can furthermore be organised by a group of people themselves, it can be
induced or requested by local leaders or by a government, or it can be induced exter-
nally to the country or region by an international organisation. The qualitative research
included an assessment of how citizens in Somali villages understand participation and
how they participate in decision-making processes. The findings provide the basis for un-
derstanding and interpreting results of the survey, which assessed if Hogaan has increased
villagers’ participation in decision-making, and enhanced accessibility, responsiveness and
inclusiveness of local governing bodies (Outcome 1).
3.1.1 Citizens’ Participation in Decision-Making
In the interviews and focus group discussions, interviewees emphasized the inclusive and
participatory nature of decision-making in their villages. They pointed to regular discus-
2 To name but a few in alphabetical order: Agarwal 2001; Cohen and Uphoff 1980, Cornwall 2000, Mohan
and Stokke 2000, Cooke and Kothari 2001, Chopra and Hohe 2004, Cornwall and Brock 2005, Hickey
and Mohan 2005, Reich 2006, Cornwall 2008, Jha et al. 2010, Hoenke and Hoenke 2012, Kyamusugulwa
2013, Mansuri and Rao 2013.
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sions and consultations about important village matters. Several interviewees outlined
that villagers come together to discuss and decide about village matters and projects:
’whenever, there is a big issue they [villagers, JB] come together and decide together’.
Although some members of the development committees attributed these meetings to
the Hogaan programme, respondents in non-implementation villages referred to similar
processes. The participatory nature of decision-making in Somali villages was confirmed
in the survey. Asked if they participate in decision-making and governance processes, the
majority of respondents in both implementation villages (60%) and non-implementation
villages (55%) emphasized their participation in community meetings and in VC meetings
(84/82%) (Figure 7).3
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Figure 7: Participation: Comparison Village Type (1/5)
While respondents thus confirmed the participatory nature of decision-making, the evalu-
ation found no evidence that the Hogaan intervention increased the level of participation
or that it sensitized villagers for the importance of these meetings, as 85% of respon-
dents in implementation villages compared to 82% of respondents in non-implementation
villages are convinced that they should attend these meetings (Figure 7).
However, during interviews and discussions it became increasingly clear that meetings
of the whole village do not happen regularly, but mainly when larger problems occur,
for example ‘when natural disasters happen, like war, drought or widespread disease.’
Village meetings are also conducted when larger development projects are envisaged,
such as ‘the digging of boreholes, mobilizing the community for a construction of a police
station and even when the construction of this office4 started, DRC and the community
came together.’ With few exceptions, development-oriented village meetings were related
to initiatives started by international organisations. Villagers also regularly mentioned
religiously driven community meetings and initiatives, such as the building of mosques,
or the organisation of religious festivities.
Interviewees again described a fairly democratic process for such major decision-
making, which is based on the selection of representatives and sometimes on public debate.
One villager, for example, described how a female representative for the VC was selected:
First, we [referring to the whole village, J.B] meet, then we divide ourselves
in the way we think is the best. At times we give our decision to people we
3 Here and in the following the first number refers to the percentage of respondents from implementation
villages, the second to the percentage of respondents from non-implementation villages.
4 The interviewee refers here to the Hogaan community hall in which the interviews were conducted
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select and we trust. Once we give our confidence to those we select, they bring
what they decide back to us and we endorse it because they are the once we
assigned. This is how we reach community decisions.
Another quite common practice of participation is through clan-based representation.
Different interviewees in several villages described these representation mechanisms. For
example one of the descriptions was as follows:
when we are making decisions here, we have a style to follow. We use the
four-clan system. [...] For example, when there is an organization that visits
us, we share things in a good way. We share things between the four clans;
among them, every clan sub-divides things on their own. Nothing comes back
[goes wrong] [...]. Clans have one elder as their representative in every task.
This is how we handle it and nobody complains about it. We share everything.
Participation in decision-making was frequently equated with information sharing. Sev-
eral interviewees also understood participation as public affirmation of decisions already
made by relevant authorities. Indeed, after discussions, many interviewees confirmed that
decisions are usually made by local authorities, most notably elders and the Village Chair-
man or a committee. If local leaders think that they require more information for a deci-
sion, they invite relevant stakeholders for consultation (for example representatives of a
women’s or youth group or of a particular clan segment), but authorities may well decide
that they already know enough about the case.
When elders sit together they inform and call others in the community includ-
ing youth, elders and women, all parts. Then they announce the decisions that
came out of their meeting.
Decisions are then reached among the local authorities after (sometimes lengthy) discus-
sions and are based on consensus. Once a decision is reached, people are informed about
it either through community meetings or more often through more informal channels.
People are supposed to, and usually do, accept these decisions:
When there is a problem, a particular group of trusted community members
are assigned to solve it. They are the ones who make decisions regarding the
problems. So, girls agree with their decisions, older women also accept them,
everybody in the community, once elders decide, tend to accept.
The survey results confirm that the overwhelming majority of villagers appreciated these
forms of decision-making. Villagers in both implementation and non-implementation vil-
lages are especially supportive of decisions made by customary authorities (Figure 8). The
overwhelming majority of respondents rate customary authorities as most responsive and
accessible. 88/89% of respondents think that elders consider their viewpoint, and 93/92%
feel that religious leaders do. They also consider customary authorities as most acces-
sible (the latter exceeding 90%). The evaluation did not find evidence that the Hogaan
programme impacted in any way on the (very high) appreciation of customary forms of
governance or the interaction of villagers with customary authorities, which exceeds 50%
in both village types.
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Figure 8: Participation Customary Authority(5/5): Comparison Village Types
While customary governance was not affected by the programme, the evaluation found
significant evidence that Hogaan increased the interaction between villagers and members
of the formal institutions of governance (VC and DC). Compared to non-implementation
villages, 18% more respondents in implementation villages interacted with the VC. Addi-
tionally 5% more respondents in implementation villages rated the VC as accessible and
6% more people are convinced that the VC considers their viewpoint (Figure 9). From
the viewpoint of the villagers, responsiveness and accessibility of the VC thus increased.
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Figure 9: Participation: Comparison Village Type (2/5)
Additionally, the interaction between villagers and the DC increased significantly, and is
13% higher in implementation villages (32/45%). In spite of the higher interaction rates,
however, villagers do not rate the DC as more accessible (85/82%) or responsive to their
views (Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Participation: Comparison Village Type (3/5)
Although villagers interact more with formal authorities, the evaluation found no evidence
that the Hogaan intervention has improved villagers’ ability or willingness to articulate de-
mands (16/13%) or that people in implementation villages are significantly more involved
in the village planning (65/57% – Figure 11).
●
●
13 (9, 18)
16 (13, 18)
●
●
58 (41, 70)
65 (49, 76)
Respondent made request of local government
Respondent Involved in Planning Process
Non−imp
Hogaan
Non−imp
Hogaan
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
percentage
(a) Percentage (%)
●
3 (−2, 7)
●
7 (0, 14)
Respondent made request of local government
Respondent Involved in Planning Process
0% 5% 10% 15%
percentage difference
significance
●a none
(b) Difference in %
Figure 11: Participation: Comparison Village Type (4/5)
To summarize, the evaluation found mixed evidence on Hogaan’s impact on participa-
tion and decision-making. The survey results indicate that Hogaan managed to build on
available mechanisms of participation, that is consultation and information sharing, and
expanded them to formal governance as it significantly increased interaction between cit-
izens and the VC and DC. It especially improved villagers’ views of the VC with respect
to accessibility and responsiveness. There is, however, no evidence that Hogaan increased
the (direct) involvement of citizens in the village planning process or that it enhanced
their ability and/or willingness to raise demands.
While governance in Somalia is already participatory to a certain extent, this does not
imply that villagers are equally represented or that they have an equal voice. The next
section will therefore assess if Hogaan managed to increase inclusiveness of governance,
in particular the inclusion of women, youth and clan minorities.
3.1.2 Participation and Inclusiveness
The programme aimed to include women, youth and minority clans. The definition of
both ‘youth’ and minority clans’ is, however, controversial. In the absence of further
clarification by the programme about whom they understand to be youth or minority, the
following section outlines and explains the definitions for youth and majority/minority
clan affiliation that were used by the evaluation team to further disaggregate the data.
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Operationalizing Inclusion: On majorities, minorities and occupational castes
The Hogaan programme explicitly states the intention to enhance participation of mi-
nority clans, without further specifying the minority groups they wish to include or de-
veloping particular measures around how to improve their participation.5 The evaluation
differentiated between two forms of belonging to a minority group:
a) as a member of a minority clan that is better described as occupational caste (Luling
1984) and
b) as a member of a politically and numerically smaller clan group in the specific
location of the project.
Although not explicitly stated, the programme targeted group a, that is occupational
castes6 and aimed at increasing their participation. With respect to this group, the eval-
uation decided to use Luling’s terminology and labelled this group as occupational caste.
More than minority clan, the caste label indicates the social and political status of mem-
bers of these groups. People with caste status are forming endogamous groups that are
not, or not fully, integrated in the segmentary lineage or clan system.7 Due to their oc-
cupation as blacksmiths, leather workers, barbers, hunters or ‘ritual specialists’ member
of caste groups are considered inferior, and are discriminated against in many aspects of
the social and political life. Indeed most castes members are extremely poor and live in
deprivation (Luling 1984; Cassanelli 1995; Hill 2010).
The evaluation differentiates this group from people from politically and numerically
smaller clan groups. Please note that the Hogaan programme did not include any refer-
ence to clan affiliation. Although the segmentary lineage system provides a social matrix
through which social and political life is organised and interpreted in Somalia, the Hogaan
programme (like other international interventions) avoided any reference to clan. How-
ever, given the importance of clan affiliation for structuring political and social live in
Somalia, the evaluation decided to integrate clan as one variable. We acknowledge the
academic debate that accompanies the utilisation of the lineage system and clan affilia-
tion to explain politics in Somalia. While some authors recognise the clan system as a
prime feature of Somali politics and to some extent interpret the clan-based character
of politics as a cause of violence (Lewis and Luling for example), others heavily criticise
this view as it ignores other social features, such as class or gender, and overlooks social
hierarchies that were introduced with commercialisation and (colonial and post-colonial)
state-building (Samatar 1992; Besteman 1996; Cassanelli and Besteman 1996; Kapteijns
2011). Clan is considered directly in the analysis of inclusion; however, clan is also a
control variable (along with gender and age) in the analysis of the overall effect of the
Hogaan project (in other words, we aim to estimate the effect of the programme if Hogaan
and non-implementation villages had the same clan, gender and age composition). This
decision may require further justification: the political systems in Somalia are based to
a large extent on clan representation. Although Somaliland moved away from clan-based
5 The evaluation team acknowledge the difficulties the programme had in identifying minorities and their
‘fear’ that the programme could stir up conflicts. Both problems were explained to the evaluation team.
6 Note again that they were not labelled as castes but as minority clans
7 Lewis (1961) first described the segmentary lineage system in Somalia. Based on patri-linear descent,
Somali society, or rather ethnic Somalis, are divided into groups that represent different levels of
segmentation as clan-families, clans, lineages and diya-paying groups. Other authors use sub-clans
instead of lineages or have introduced further levels (sub-clans, sub-sub-clans etc.).
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representation with the introduction of a multi-party democracy, it nonetheless has an
unelected Upper House that is based on clan representation the Guurti (chamber of el-
ders). Somaliland undoubtedly made remarkable steps towards democratisation. However
clan still plays a significant role in determining political alliances as well as voter decisions
(for example RVI 2013).
Puntland’s politics is, in contrast, explicitly clan based. Already its territorial claim is
grounded in the demarcation of Darood/Harti (i.e. Majerteen, Dhulbahante, Warsangeli)
clan territory, and the parliament is constituted through representation of the Harti clans.
The Parliament is thus dominated by Majerteen, which are considered the numerically
largest Darood/Harti clan.8 The three numerically largest Majerteen sub-clans, Cumar
Maxamud, Cisse Maxamud and Cismaan Maxamud, largely dominate the government,
and to date the Presidency has rotated between these three sub-clans. Each of the three
sub-clans again dominates one of the three Puntland regions, that is Mudug, Nugal and
Bari (ICG 2013). Members of other Majerteen clan thus have a minority status, with-
out necessarily being discriminated against. Many of the villages in Burtinle and North
Galkayo district where the Hogaan programme was implemented were inhabited by peo-
ple from the Majerteen/Cumar Maxamud clan, which left village inhabitants of other
(sub-)clans numerically in a minority status. Village and district level governance have a
similar representational mechanism, and while Cumar Maxamud may dominate a district,
they nonetheless do not necessarily dominate every single village. One clan can hence be
a minority in a district, but still form a majority in a particular village or, the other way
round, be a majority in a village but a minority in the district. The latter is, for exam-
ple, the case in villages mainly inhabited by Darood/Leelkaase or the Darood/Awrtable.
While descending from the Darood clan family, they are not part of the Majerteen clan
and thus form a clan minority in the districts of Puntland.
The following tables (3.1-3.3) provide an overview of the clan-affiliation of the inter-
viewees in the three districts.
Clan N Percentage
Darood/Majerteen/Cumar Maxamud 263 57
Darood/Majerteen/Other 64 14
Darood/Majerteen/Ciise Maxamud 61 13
Darood/Awrtable 30 6
Darood/Other (not Majerteen) 22 5
Other Clan Families 11 2
Darood/Lelkasse 9 2
Darood/Majerteen/Cismaan Maxamud 3 1
Table 3.1: Clan Distribution of Burtinle Survey Respondents
Beyond the national level, village level governance is, in both Somaliland and Punt-
land, structured by clan affiliation, although of course not exclusively so. As outlined
above, clan affiliation plays an important role in how participation and representation are
organised. It was also identified in interviews and focus groups as crucial for structuring
village level governance as it constitutes the main principle for selecting Village Council
representatives. Members of village administrations are usually selected by clan elders,
8 Please note that numerical differences between clan segments, and independence of the level of segmen-
tation, are not based on statistically reliable information but rather on powered negotiations of clan
sections within the lineage system.
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Clan N Percentage
Darood/Majerteen/Cumar Maxamud 291 60
Darood/Majerteen/Other 87 18
Darood/Lelkasse 42 9
Darood/Other (not Majerteen) 29 6
Other Clan Families 18 4
Darood/Majerteen/Ciise Maxamud 9 2
Darood/Awrtable 7 1
Darood/Majerteen/Cismaan Maxamud 3 1
Table 3.2: Clan Distribution of Galkayo Survey Respondents
Clan N Percentage
Isaaq/Habar Yonis 159 30
Darood/Warsangeli 142 27
Isaaq/Habar Jeclo 141 27
Darood/Dulbahante 57 11
Darood/Other 21 4
Isaaq/Other 5 1
Other Clan Families 5 1
Table 3.3: Clan Distribution of Erigabo Survey Respondents
often in co-operation with other, locally powerful actors such as wealthy business people
or religious authorities. The composition of the council is intended to match the (nego-
tiated not calculated!) numerical strength of clan, sub-clans or lineages in the village. A
local leader in Erigabo district explained the procedure during a Focus Group Discussion
(FGD):
We are Somalis and you know we have differences. We are from different
clans. We wanted to be cautious and we wanted to go to every clan and get
their representation so that people are balanced. Then every clan could appear
in the committee. So every clan living here has a member in the committee;
this was the case till the 1940s and it continues like that now.
Clan-based representation was also stressed by respondents from villages in Puntland.
Here the example of a young businessman who explained composition of the administra-
tion in one village in North Galkayo district:
We have a chairman and a vice chairman who are from the two main tribes in
[village name]. The chairman is always from Reer Xirsi and the vice chairman
is usually from Reer Mahad.
Interviewer: Why always these two tribes? What do you think is
the reason?
They are the majority in terms of numbers, they have the majority of the
business here, and they are the ones who contribute the largest share for the
contributions that are collected, but the other tribes are still members of the
administration committee.
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Given the political importance of clan affiliation for representational mechanisms, the
evaluation recorded the clan family, clan, subclan and lineage of respondents.9 The evalu-
ation then calculated the strength of each clan at all levels in all villages and identified the
highest level at which a significant division between groups in the village was detected.
The threshold was set at 60%, which means that if 60% or more respondents were from
one clan segment, this segment was classified as the majority clan of the village, while oth-
ers gained the minority label. The evaluation team acknowledges that this method does
not address many of the complexities of clan affiliations. Nevertheless, in the absence of
previous attempts to quantify the relational dynamics of clan affiliations in villages in
Somaliland and Puntland, this approach is considered as a starting point. Certainly, the
resulting variable is a highly significant predictor of many attitudes, whilst more straight-
forward measures, which are not relative to the village majority (eg just the clan), are
not significant.
Youth in Somalia/Somaliland
In the Theory of Change (ToC), young people are described as being marginalised in
decision-making processes. The Hogaan intervention thus aimed at increasing participa-
tion of young people in village level governance. However, no definition of youth was
given. While age obviously serves as the main criterion for the definition of youth, social
practices in Somalia do not provide clear age delineations or other criteria that allow for
a precise definition of youth. Instead a combination of personal attributes, such as age,
marriage status, children, sex, occupation (going to school/university) or income deter-
mine if a person is considered as youth or adult. Often enough people can be considered
youth by some people and on one occasion, but as adults by other people or on other oc-
casions, or may self-define their status differently at different occasions.10 In the absence
of clearly formulated alternatives, for simplicity, the evaluation team decided to classify
youth exclusively by age. However, to account for the flexibility of age, youth was in the
first comparison defined narrowly as people aged 18-25 years (youth 1), in the second
comparison more broadly as people aged 18-35 years (youth 2). Youth 2 was selected as
a major reference. However, in case the analysis provided different results on programme
effects of these age groups, they will be presented in the findings. If no specific reference
is made, the results refer to youth 2.
Differential Participation Effects: Gender
The Hogaan programme put considerable effort into increasing the participation of women
in decision-making processes. However, the evaluation found no evidence that the pro-
gramme has differentially increased women’s participation in formal governance.11 VC
meetings are, for example, fairly gender balanced in both implementation and non-imple-
mentation villages (Figure 12). This can be contrasted with community meetings. There
is no significant difference between the proportions of women and men who think they
9 The baseline also tried to identify clan affiliation of respondents, but skipped the question due to worries
about enumerators’ safety. The endline survey included training of how to ask about clan affiliation of
respondents and successfully gathered clan data of 98% of respondents (1571 out of the total of 1604
respondents). No safety issues occurred.
10The same applies to the term elder. While a lot of elders are indeed older men, there is no age threshold
that restricts becoming an elder. Sometimes men in their thirties are respected as elders; sometimes
old men have no voice as elders in committees.
11Remember that significance of the difference is now presented in the third parallel running graph.
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should attend community meetings (over 80% think this). However, fewer women than
men actually do attend these meetings, (-10/-16%). The difference between the 10% fewer
women in implementation and and -16% fewer women in non-implementation villages, is
not statistically significant and therefore we cannot rule out the hypothesis that there is
no difference between Hogaan and non-implementation villages.
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Figure 12: Participation: Comparison Village Type (1/4)
There is also no evidence that the Hogaan intervention differentially increased the ac-
cessibility or responsiveness of the VC for women (Figure 13). Women in both village
types are significantly less likely to interact with the VC (-17%/-25%). Although rates
of engagement of women in non-implementation villages are much lower than those of
women in Hogaan villages, the rates of engagement of men are also much lower and the
difference in the difference is not significant. In spite of their significantly lower inter-
action with the VC, the majority (80%) of female respondents in both implementation
and non-implementation villages rate the VC as accessible and are convinced that the
VC considers their views. There is thus no very clear correlation between higher rates of
engagement and the assessment of the responsiveness of governance institutions.
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Figure 13: Participation: Comparison Gender (2/4)
A similar pattern characterises the interaction of women and men with the DC (Figure 14).
Women are significantly less likely to interact with the DC than men in implementation
and non-implementation villages (-13/-23%). However, comparing interaction differences
between men and women, the difference between Hogaan and non-implementation villages
is statistically not significant. Lower interaction does again not correspond with a lack of
accessibility or responsiveness. More than 70% men and over 80% women in implemen-
tation as well as non-implementation villages are convinced that the DC considers their
views and over 78% of respondents of both sexes rate the DC as accessible.
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Figure 14: Participation: Comparison Gender (3/4)
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In contrast to formal governance, the evaluation did find significant effects on the in-
teraction of women with customary authorities (See Figure 59 in Appendix). Women
generally interact much less with elders and religious leaders than men, but the differ-
ence between men and women is significantly lower in implementation villages where 20%
fewer women interact with elders compared to 39% fewer women in non-implementation
villages, amounting to a 19% difference. A similar pattern is found with respect to religious
authorities. In both village types women are much less likely to interact with religious
leaders, but the difference between men and women is significantly lower in implementa-
tion villages. In both implementation and non-implementation villages, women rank elders
and religious leaders as most accessible (>93%) and responsive (elders >86%; religious
leaders >91%).
The evaluation did not find evidence that the Hogaan programme impacted on any
other participation measures with respect to gender (see Figures in Appendix: Further
Results). To summarize, the Hogaan programme did differentially increase interaction
of women especially with customary authorities. Recall that in implementation villages,
women do interact significantly more with the VC and the DC than in non-implementation
villages; however, there is no evidence of a particular gender effect as men also interact
more. The evaluation additionally found no evidence that higher rates of engagement
with local institutions impacted on how respondents assessed either the accessibility or
responsiveness of these institutions. For example, women interact much less with formal
and customary institutions than men, but nonetheless share the views of men on accessi-
bility and responsiveness of these institutions. And although interactions of women with
customary institutions increased in implementation villages, this increase did not trans-
late into significantly higher ratings of responsiveness or accessibility of elders or religious
authorities.
Differential Participation Effects: Youth
The evaluation did not find evidence that the programme had a significant differential
effect on youth participation in community or VC meetings, the accessibility of the VC and
DC for young people or the participation of youth in planning processes (Figures 15, 16 and
82 (Appendix)). Young people rate the accessibility of institutions higher than adults, if
anything. Irrespective of the village type, more than 80% of youth respondents rate formal
institutions as accessible, and over 90% rate customary institutions as accessible. Young
people, however, interact significantly less with formal and with customary institutions:
they interact less with the VC (-10/-17%), the DC (-11/-10%), elders (-13/-17%), and
religious leaders (-13/-20%) (Figures 15). We do not find a significant difference in the
difference between youth and elder interactions with local authorities in implementation
and non-implementation villages. However, in implementation villages young people rate
the responsiveness of formal and customary institutions higher, and youth here are more
convinced than adults that the DC considers their viewpoint (85% youth, 81% adults,
difference: 4%). In non-implementation villages young people are -11% less likely to rate
the DC as responsive, and are also more critical than adults in the same village type
(72% youth, 79% adults, difference -7%). Additionally, significantly more young people
in implementation villages rate elders and religious leaders as responsive. If youth group
1 (18-25years) is taken as reference, these differences are slightly larger (see Appendix:
Further Results).
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Figure 15: Participation: Comparison Youth (2/3)
Although we did not find evidence of a general effect on the ability of citizens to artic-
ulate demands, we nevertheless do find a significant effect of the Hogaan programme on
young people. Whilst youth in implementation villages are as likely as adults to articulate
requests, they are significantly less likely to do so (-13% difference in the difference) in
non-implementation villages (Figures 16).
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Figure 16: Participation: Comparison Youth (3/3)
To summarize, evidence of the impact of Hogaan on youth’s inclusion and participation
in decision-making is mixed. Measured relative to older people, the programme did not
significantly enhance the rates of participation of young people in meetings, nor did it
increase interaction of young people with the VC or informal authorities. Nonetheless,
the programme had a positive impact on how young people rate responsiveness of formal
as well as customary institutions. Relative to older people, they are significantly more
likely in Hogaan villages to believe that their viewpoint is considered by the DC, elders
and religious authorities. We also found evidence that Hogaan improved the relative ability
of young people to raise demands.
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Differential Participation Effects: Clan
Clan affiliation in general and membership of a majority or minority clan in particular
have a significant impact on most participation measures. For example, 8/14% fewer
people from minority clans attend community meetings and 2/16% fewer attend VC
meetings. Although the programme did not aim at influencing the clan-based character of
politics in Somalia, the evaluation found evidence that the programme had a differential
positive impact on some participation measures (Figures ??-19). Relative to majority clan
members, people from minority clans in implementation villages are 11% more involved in
village planning. Evidence also suggests that Hogaan improved the relative interaction of
minorities with the DC (18%) and with elders (9%), and increased the relative accessibility
of elders and religious leaders (7%) for members of minority clans.12
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Figure 17: Participation: Comparison Clan (1/3)
12Please note here that non-implementation villages were more clan homogeneous than implementation
villages. Although we control for this, comparability with respect to clan dynamics may be somewhat
limited and caution should be used in the interpretation of the programme effects we discover.
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Figure 18: Participation: Comparison Clan (2/3)
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Figure 19: Participation: Comparison Clan (3/3)
With respect to occupational castes, the programme explicitly aimed at increasing their
participation but largely failed to identify caste members in villages. No specific measures
were thus developed to increase their participation or at least to limit discrimination.13
While numbers of caste members are too small to allow for a meaningful comparison be-
tween implementation and non-implementation villages, and thus implementation effects
can not be determined, the evaluation analysed participation and inclusion of caste mem-
bers within the implementation villages to provide a clearer analysis of their marginalised
status. The analysis shows very clearly that members of occupational castes differ signifi-
cantly in most measures from people with majority clan background. 26% fewer members
of occupational castes attend community meetings. Caste members have 15% lower in-
teraction rates with VC members and are 12% less convinced that their viewpoint is
considered by the VC. They also find the VC less accessible and are significantly less
likely to participate in village planning processes (-16% – Figure 20).
13Many hurdles in the identification of caste members were identified by the programme staff. Generally
speaking, however, the identification of caste members is neither very difficult nor particularly conflict-
sensitive. Implementation of measures to improve the socio-economic or even political status of outcast
groups, on the other hand, is very likely to cause tensions.
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Figure 20: Participation: Comparison Clan
The evaluation cannot assess whether there has been a change in the position of occu-
pational castes, but does clearly show that their participation in planning and decision-
making is significantly lower that participation of people within the segmentary lineage
system. However, to summarize the effect of Hogaan on participation of minority clans re-
mains difficult, as the operationalisation of clan dynamics for quantitative purposes is not
yet fully developed. Hogaan, however, seems to have had a positive effect on participation
of people from minority clans.
Inclusiveness of Planning and Decision-Making
The evaluation found evidence that the Hogaan programme had a positive effect on the
householders’ perception of inclusiveness in decision-making. Overall, a large majority of
villagers even in non-implementation villages believe that village level decision-making
is inclusive, but nevertheless this view was significantly more prevalent in implementa-
tion villages. The conclusion that women, youth and minority clans are significantly more
involved in decision-making remains intact even if the analysis is restricted to women,
youth and minority clans. Women in implementation villages feel that women are sig-
nificantly more involved in the planning process (13%); similarly youth feel that youth
are significantly more involved (15%). However, the evaluation did not find significantly
more women or young people who answered that they themselves have actually partici-
pated in village planning. On the other hand, the evaluation did find that minority clan
members were more likely to believe themselves to be be involved in planning in imple-
mentation than in non-implementation villages (17%). There is therefore evidence that
the programme has had an impact on both the perception of group inclusion, and on the
individual level feelings of inclusion of marginalised groups. However, there is not a simple
one-to-one relationship between these. Group levels feelings of inclusion in particular are
not necessarily reflected in individual level patterns of inclusion (Figures 21-23).
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Figure 21: Women’s Perception and Factual Involvement in Planning
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Figure 22: Youth Perception and Factual Involvement in Planning
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Figure 23: Minority Clan Perception and Factual Involvement in Planning
If answers of marginalised people are further disaggregated by gender, profound imbal-
ances become visible. Young women in implementation villages are with -17% significantly
less involved than young men in planning and -14% fewer female than male members of
minority groups participate in planning. However independent of their gender and age,
men and women are nearly equally convinced that youth (80%) and minority groups
(77%) are indeed integrated in the planning processes.
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Figure 24: Young Men/Women Perception and Factual Involvement in Planning
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Figure 25: Minority Clan Men/Women Perception and Factual Involvement in Planning
Inclusiveness and Equality
In order to determine if the project had an impact on citizens’ views on equality norms,
respondents were asked if they believe that marginalised groups (women, youths, clans,
occupational castes) should be protected by the law, if they should have equal rights and if
they currently have equal rights. While an overwhelming majority of respondents believe
that women (98/98%) and youth (97/96%) have the right to be protected by the law, 7%
less respondents in implementation villages believe that rights should be equal for women
(69/77%) and significantly less (-9%) that it should be equal for youth (77/86%).
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Figure 26: Women’s Rights
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Figure 27: Youth Rights
An overwhelming majority of respondents agree with the view that people from minority
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clans should have equal rights, and that they are entitled to legal protection. Substantially
fewer respondents believe that occupational caste members either should have (79/82%)
or indeed do have (64/62%) equal rights. The evaluation finds no significant difference
between implementation and non-implementation villages on these measures. In general,
gender, age and clan affiliation of respondents had no significant effect on the percep-
tion of equality norms. In non-implementation villages, 11% more women support gender
equality. However, we find no evidence that the lower difference in implementation villages
is attributed to the project. Hogaan did not sensitize villagers on equality questions, as
people in implementation as well as non-implementation villages are relatively aware of
the fact that women and youth do not have the same rights. Only half of the respondents
in both village types are convinced that women (51/52%) and youth (57/55%) indeed
have the same rights and there is no difference between men and women in how they rate
the equality status (Figures 60 and 61 in Appendix).
Inclusiveness of Governance Institutions
The evaluation also assessed how inclusive community needs prioritisation is and which
of the locally governing bodies is considered the most inclusive. The evaluation found no
evidence that the Hogaan programme had an impact either on defining or on clarifying
responsibilities for inclusive governance. In both implementation and non-implementation
villages, religious leaders are considered the most inclusive, but significantly lower in
implementation villages with respect to considering priorities of women (94/99%) and
occupational castes (82/90%). The VC, DC and elders rank fairly equally in both village
types, with prioritisation of women or youth issues ranking between 80-90%, and caste
group between 70 and 75%. Villagers also seem to agree that priorities of occupational
castes are least considered by all governing institutions (Figure 50 in Appendix).
Inclusiveness of Conflict Resolution
The evaluation did find a significant difference between implementation and non-implementation
villages with respect to inclusiveness of conflict resolution. Generally the majority of peo-
ple in both implementation and non-implementation villages (81/82%) state that conflict
resolution is effective. However, 9% more respondents in Hogaan villages (77/68%) believe
that woman are addressed in conflict resolution and 9% more (77/68%) believe that youth
issues are. This result corresponds with the general higher perception of inclusiveness in
implementation villages (Figure 28).
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Figure 28: Conflict Mechanisms: Comparison Village Type
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Local Leaders on Equality Norms
The leadership survey asked local authorities for their views on equality and rights protec-
tion. The majority of local leaders in both implementation (77%) and non-implementation
villages (76%) think that women and men should have equal rights. A similar percentage
of leaders in both village types (71/68%) are convinced that equal rights are already re-
alised. However, authorities in Hogaan villages are more sensitized towards the difficulties
of including women in decision-making: 21% more authorities in Hogaan villages (58/36%)
acknowledge that women often play a limited role in decision-making and 22% more au-
thorities admit the difficulty to including women (51/28%). Hogaan thus had a positive
effect on sensitizing local leaders on gendered access to participation and decision-making.
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Figure 29: Leader Perception Women’s Rights and Inclusion: Comparison Village Type
There are no significant differences on the local leaders’ views on rights of youth, minority
clans or caste groups. The majority of authorities in both Hogaan and non-implementation
villages is convinced that youth and minority clans should have and actually do have the
same rights as older people and people from majority clans (See Figure 55 in Appendix).
Conclusion: Hogaan’s impact on participation/inclusion
The evaluation finds mixed evidence for programme effects on citizens’ participation in
local level governance. The programme improved interaction of villagers with formal gov-
erning bodies and interaction of women with customary authorities, and increased re-
sponsiveness of the Village Council and District Council (from the viewpoint of villagers).
The evaluation however found no evidence that the intervention had an overall effect on
other participation measures, such as participation of citizens in village planning or other
decision-making processes. Additionally, the capacity or willingness of citizens to raise de-
mands was not significantly affected by the Hogaan intervention. Given the priority and
effort Hogaan puts into sensitizing villagers to define needs and demand adequate services
and, especially during village entry and the CAP process, to participate in planning, this
result is rather disappointing.
Evidence for the programme’s objective to particularly increase participation of margi-
nalised groups - women, youth and outcasts - is rather weak. Participation of member of
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these groups is much lower, and there is no evidence that Hogaan increased either women’s
or youth’s participation in decision-making. However, it enhanced interaction of women
with customary authorities and managed to support young people to articulate demands.
The evaluation was unable to determine an intervention effect on occupational castes,
and caste members participate much less in decision-making processes than members of
other clan groups. There is evidence that the participation of minority clans has increased.
The intervention had a positive effect on the responsiveness of local institutions. Villagers
in implementation villages are generally convinced that their viewpoints are considered,
especially by formal authorities. People in Hogaan villages are also inclined to believe
that local institutions are inclusive, although the evaluation found limited individual level
evidence to support this.
The programme did not have a positive impact on the promotion of equality norms,
and may have negatively impacted on norms surrounding gender and youth equality.
However, it sensitized local leaders to the priorities of marginalised groups although, like
ordinary citizens, most leaders are convinced that inclusion is already realised.
3.2 Improving Governance Capacity (Outcome 2)
In its problem statement, the ToC elaborated that village level governance is challenged
by its unclear legal status, acknowledged hybridity14 and suggested among others that lack
of role clarification between VC, elders and sub-committees hampers the efficiency of local
institutions.The programme thus aimed at strengthening planning and management ca-
pacities of local authorities, while at the same time enhancing service delivery and conflict
management. The following section presents the results of the evaluation of governance
capacity. While the qualitative interviews assessed how village governance actually works,
focusing on the role of elders and the VC, the survey results show if the programme has
indeed improved local level governance, from the viewpoint of the citizens, with respect
to overall service delivery and conflict management, and has thus strengthened leaders’
capacity to steer and manage development.
3.2.1 Coordination and Administration
The qualitative research confirms that village-level institutions lack clear definitions of
roles and responsibilities. Neither the local authorities themselves nor ordinary citizens
were clear about the tasks or division of labour between the institutions. When asked
what and who exactly constitutes the village government or village administration (ma-
muul), villagers were quite divided in their views. In Somaliland (Erigabo), some villagers
referred exclusively to formal institutions, such as the VC and the mayor, and interpreted
administration as a representation of the Somaliland government. Reflecting this view, a
woman in a village in Erigabo-district even insisted that her village does not know any
forms of administration as ‘the ordinary people administer themselves’. Most villagers in
both Somaliland and Puntland, however, were of the opinion that the village administra-
14The term hybridity is not used in the ToC but introduced by the consultants referring to those sections
in the document that elaborate on the mix of formal and customary mechanisms to conflict resolution.
In the ToC document the relevance of both formal (i.e. recognised by law) and informal (’traditional’)
governance structures in Somalia and Somaliland and the importance both play for delivering a broad
range of governance services, among them conflict resolution, is emphasized.
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tion consists of both the Village Council and non-state actors, such as elders or religious
leaders.
As outlined above, clan-affiliation constitutes the main principle for selecting Village
Council representatives. There is a clear overlap between elders and the VC, as the VC in
many villages, both implementation and non-implementation, includes elders.15 Most in-
terviewees, including local authorities and citizens, outlined that elders and VC members
co-operate in the running of everyday affairs. Some respondents saw the VC mainly as in-
stitution in support of the elders, while others referred to complementary and co-operative
roles between them. Accordingly, elders deal with conflicts, work for social cohesion and
represent the interest of the clans, while the village administration provides a link to the
district and to international organisations. However, other interviewees insisted that el-
ders, and not the village administration, provide the more important link to higher level
governance. Beyond representing clan-members in distress and in situations of conflict,
elders also represent the interest of their clan group more widely. One high ranking elder
(nabadoon) summarized this view:
The committee plays its part. But conflicts are always solved by the Odayaasha
[elders] and Nabadoonada [clan leaders]. However, the committee works in
facilitating negotiations and they work with the Nabadoonada and Odayaasha
for finding sustainable solutions. They also take part in awareness raising, and
they bring people together and they are good role examples.
All (!) interviewees acknowledged the importance of elders in regulating the daily affairs
of the village and in particular in dealing with conflicts.16 One elder was quite explicit in
a focus group discussion about the role and significance of elders compared to the VC:
Odayaashu (elders) are more important to the community. The nominated
administration is ineffective, but Odayaal (elders) are the ones who have filled
the gap. You cannot compare someone who is working with someone who has
just a title but is doing nothing. For us our priority is Odayaal (elders).
While this view may be extreme, many interviewees, including those who stressed the
complementary and co-operative relations between the village administration and elders,
identified elders as the final instance of governance and decision-making at the village level.
This was often related to the collapse of the state and especially the state’s provision of
security, which left people in need of organising security themselves. As one member of a
development committee outlined:
Since the administration has no police, it is Odayaasha (Elders) who help
in conflict mediations and they are the law enforcement. At this moment the
chairman is in [village name] with a group of elders to mediate a conflict about
water.
15Just a reminder that the term ’elder’ (oday) is used rather flexibly and usually means respected man. It
has no age threshold and even a young man in the 30s can be classified as oday. However, the particular
status of an elder depends on different factors, among them his genealogical position, individual skills
and personal reputation, and not least his individual and family wealth. These things contribute to
whether he is viewed as important and if he is respected enough to negotiate for his clan constituency,
for example in conflicts, or whether he has a voice in a committee.
16This view was only not shared by two interviewees, one woman on one member of the VC, who identified
the VC as most important institution for conflict management.
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Interviewer: Which one is more important, Odayaasha or the administra-
tion?
Odayaashu are more important.
Although interviewees in both implementation and non-implementation villages empha-
sized the importance of elders, most interviewees saw the main responsibility of the VC in
the development of the village and in co-operation with international organisations. This
was confirmed in the quantitative analysis, which found clear differences across implemen-
tation and non-implementation villages between governance responsibilities of different
institutions. Classical development issues, such as road construction (Figure 105), provi-
sion of water (Figure 107) and education (Figure 110) were assigned to formal institutions
by the majority of respondents.
There was some ambiguity as to the precise goals of the role clarification aspects of
the programme. It was not clear if the aim was a general strengthening of the formal
institutional mechanisms relative to the traditional mechanisms, or if simply there was
to be agreement across leaders and citizens that certain tasks were carried out by cer-
tain bodies. In the quantitative assessment, we looked for any of two patterns. First, the
evaluation looked for a general preference for formal institutions in carrying out tasks rela-
tive to traditional institutions in implementation villages (relative to non-implementation
villages). Second, we looked to see if responsibilities for specific tasks differed between
implementation and non-implementation villages. Then we compared citizens’ views with
leaders’ views on this specific task, looking for similar patterns of change in both.
The quantitative assessment did find very clear and systematic differences between im-
plementation and non-implementation villages. However, what the evaluation found did
not conform to either of the patterns outlined above. In general, there was no significant
difference between implementation and non-implementation villages in the proportion of
citizens assigning tasks to formal relative to traditional institutions, nor was there a com-
mon change in views across citizens and leaders. Instead, the evaluation found evidence
that Hogaan had a profound impact on how villagers define roles between formal vil-
lage level and district level institutions. Significantly more respondents in implementation
villages assign major institutional roles and responsibilities to the VC, and significantly
fewer to the DC on every task. Accordingly, more people in implementation villages think
that the VC is responsible for the delivery of social services (44/30%), security (34/16%),
development (road: 27/19%, water: 38/25%), resource management (37/26%), represen-
tation of the community (32/21%) and even conflict resolution (21/9%) (See Figures in
Appendix B.6). The two figures below on social services (Figure 30) and security provi-
sion (Figure 31) are provided as examples to show that the intervention caused a clear
preference shift from the DC to the VC, while the number of people in implementation
and non-implementation villages who assign these responsibility to customary institutions
are fairly similar.
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Figure 30: Institutional Responsibility for Social Services: Comparison Village Type
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Figure 31: Institutions Responsible for Security: Comparison Village Type
This pattern is repeated with respect to other institutional responsibilities. Overall, re-
spondents in implementation village are more inclined to attribute development and gov-
ernance responsibilities to the VC. If data is further disaggregated, the programme had
a particular impact on adults (>34 years) with respect to institutional responsibilities.
Compared with youth (18-35), the difference between adult preferences on institutional
responsibilities is significantly greater. In non-implementation villages, adults are more
inclined to assign governance and development responsibilities to the DC, including the
provision of social services, security, conflict resolution and water: while adults in imple-
mentation villages tend to assign these roles to the VC. The Hogaan intervention thus
strengthened citizens’ confidence in formal village institutions (VC), and particularly en-
hanced the confidence of adults.
In contrast to age, gender and affiliation to a majority or minority clan had no con-
sistent effect on how people assign responsibilities (see Figures in Appendix: Further Re-
sults). Overall, more men than women in non-implementation villages tend to attribute
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responsibilities to the DC. The relation is the opposite with respect to the VC, in which
fewer men seem to have confidence. However, evidence for a significant effect of the pro-
gramme on gender can only be found with respect to security provision, where 16% more
men than women in non-implementation villages attribute responsibility to the DC com-
pared to only 4% more men in implementation villages.
The answer pattern is even more inconclusive with respect to majority/minority clan
affiliation of respondents. Overall there is no significant difference in how people with ma-
jority and majority clan background assign governance responsibilities, with the exception
of provision of clean water. Here 22% more people with majority clan background were
inclined to rely on district authorities (61% majority background compared to 38% from
minority background), while in implementation villages there were no major differences
between people from these clan groups with around 35/38% respondents supporting the
DC. Minority clans in the same time decreased their support for elders by 13% and in-
stead opt more, and in a fairly similar percentage (36%) than people from majority clans
(39%) for the VC.
Institutional support for rights
The shift from the DC to the VC in implementation villages can also be detected in the
view of people on which institutions should support specific rights. With respect to the
right to justice (Figure 108), the right to equality (Figure 109), education (Figure 109),
health care (Figure 111), consultation (Figure112) and free speech (Figure 113), signifi-
cantly more villagers in implementation villages assigned supportive roles to the VC while
the number of people attributing support to the DC shrinks. Customary authorities in
contrast were in all cases rated fairly similarly in implementation and non-implementation
villages (Figures in Appendix: Further Results).
The only exception to this pattern is found in citizens’ views on the right to life
(Figure 114). While 8% more respondents in implementation villages think that the VC
should support the right to life, this increase appears to impact on the elders rather than on
the DC. Although the majority of respondents in implementation and non-implementation
villages (45/55%) retain the view that elders should support the right to life, the number in
implementation villages was 10% lower. However, this single case should not be given too
much emphasis, especially against the background of the very consistent shift in attitudes
seen on all other measures of citizens’ views.
Local Leaders views on Roles and Responsibilities
Despite the substantial change in citizens’ perceptions, the evaluation did not find evidence
that the Hogaan programme substantially changed the view of roles and responsibilities of
local leaders. In particular the public tendency in implementation villages to assign more
responsibilities to the VC is not mirrored by the leaders, which confirms the conclusion
that the impact of the programme was to a lesser extent on clarifying institutional roles
and responsibilities than on changing citizens’ view on the institutional importance and
service delivery capacities of the VC.
However, from the viewpoint of local leaders, the intervention has very significantly
improved their relation to the district government: 36% more local leaders in implementa-
tion than in non-implementation villages state that their relations with district authorities
have improved and 33% more leaders in implementation villages are convinced that their
relation to the government is improved.
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Figure 32: Relations Village and Government: Comparison Village Type
To summarize, the evaluation did not find evidence that supports the conclusion that the
programme has contributed to the clarification of role and responsibilities of village level
institutions. We did not find evidence of a significant change in the division of respon-
sibilities between formal and traditional institutions, nor did we find significant shifts in
the attribution of roles and responsibilities consistent across citizens and leaders. Nev-
ertheless, despite not changing the level of support for formal institutions as a whole,
the programme did substantially shift citizens’ support for the VC relative to the DC. In
implementation villages, citizens (but not leaders) assigned significantly more responsi-
bility to the VC and correspondingly less to the DC, leaving the roles and responsibilities
assigned to customary authorities largely unchanged.
3.2.2 Service Delivery
The Hogaan programme aimed to build confidence in local governance institutions by
involving those institutions, particularly the VC in delivering services. It is noteworthy
that the satisfaction rate of villagers with service-delivering capacities of the formal local
institutions is quite high. More than 70% of respondents in both implementation and
non-implementation villages agree that the formal governing bodies provide services, can
manage projects, and are transparent and accountable. The evaluation did not find evi-
dence that Hogaan influenced villagers’ assessment of the service-delivering capacities of
local institutions, with the exception of management capacity of the VC. 8% more people
in implementation villages are convinced that the VC can manage projects. Despite the
central focus of the Hogaan programme on enabling the VC and development committee
to provide services, it had neither a significant effect on how villagers rate the service
delivery capacity of locally governing institutions nor on how they rate the management
capacities of both VC and DC.
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Figure 33: Service Delivery: Comparison Village Type
How inclusive is the high satisfaction rate?
With respect to age, young people under 34 in implementation villages are significantly
more satisfied with services delivered by the VC and DC, and again significantly more
youngsters are convinced that the formal institutions are able to manage projects, and
that they do so in a transparent and accountable way. In non-implementation villages,
the differences between young people and adults are not significant on most measures.
However, the differences between implementation and non-implementation villages were
not sufficiently large for us to be confident that there is a programme effect.
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Figure 34: Service Delivery: Comparison Youth Adults
Gender and clan affiliation had no significant effect on the assessment of service and man-
agement capacities of local governments, and the programme found no evidence that the
intervention had an impact on gendered or clan-based views of respondents. Men and
women rate the capacities of local governing bodies relatively equally. Members of mi-
nority clans in both implementation and non-implementation villages are in some cases,
especially relating to the DC, significantly less satisfied with the service and management
capacities of the formal institutions, but we do not find a significant difference in these dif-
ferences between implementation and non-implementation villages (cf. Appendix: Further
Results).
3.2.3 Conflict Management
A large number of villagers in both implementation (81%) and non-implementation vil-
lages (82%) are convinced that conflict resolution mechanisms are effective. However,
5% more people in implementation villages report that conflicts are resolved peacefully
(94/89%).
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Figure 35: Conflict Resolution: Comparison Village Type
The evaluation found no evidence for a significant difference in the resolution of most
single issue conflicts (clan, water, grazing conflicts etc.), with the exception of leadership
conflicts. 10% more respondents in implementation villages report that leadership conflicts
are solved.
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Figure 36: Conflict Issues: Comparison Village Type
This view corresponds with the self-assessment of local authorities. In general, on most
conflict types, leaders in implementation and non-implementation villages are equally
likely to report the successful resolution of conflicts. As in the citizen survey, leadership
conflicts are the only conflict type where a significant difference is found. 16% more local
leaders in implementation villages are convinced that leadership issues are successfully
resolved, while there is no significant difference between them with respect to other types
and issues of conflict.
There is no evidence that age or gender had an overall effect on the assessment of
conflict resolution and conflict management capacities (cf.Appendix: Further Results).
The programme however had a positive effect on the inclusiveness of conflict resolution.
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In accordance with the general perception of increased inclusiveness (Section 3.1.2 of this
report), 9% more people in implementation villages are convinced that women’s issues
(78/69%) and youth issues (77/68%) are considered in conflict resolution.
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Figure 37: Inclusiveness of Conflict Resolution: Comparison Village Types
Clan did not affect villagers assessment of conflict resolution, with the exception of the
resolution of clan issues. Here the programme had a significant impact on the satisfaction
of minority clans. In non-implementation villages, 11% fewer people from minority clans
(81%) think that clan-issues are resolved, while the percentage of minority clans who
believe that clan issues are resolved rose to 90% in implementation villages and is thus
nearly equal to people with majority clan affiliation (91%).
3.2.4 Trust in Village Governance
The evaluation also addressed the level of trust of citizens in diverse institutions of gover-
nance. In general, levels of trust in customary institutions, elders and religious authorities
are very high. Trust rates exceed 90% in both implementation and non-implementation
villages. The Hogaan programme did not affect these high levels of trust in customary
institutions.
Trust in formal institutions, that is Village and District Councils, was considerably
lower than trust in customary institutions. However, trust in formal institutions was
significantly higher in implementation villages than in non-implementation villages with
respect to the VC (9%) and to the DC (8%). Overall 88% of respondents stated that
they trust both the VC and DC, compared to 79% in non-implementation villages. This
provides evidence that Hogaan increased citizens’ trust in formal governance institutions
at village and district level.
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Figure 38: Trust: Comparison Village Type
Inclusiveness of trust measures: gender, age, clan
Women are generally more likely than men to trust formal authorities. In both implemen-
tation and non-implementation villages 5% more women than men express trust in the
VC and DC. The general increase in trust in implementation villages is relatively equally
shared by men and women, and Hogaan did thus not have a gendered effect on trust
measures. There are no significant gender differences in trust in customary institutions,
with men and women in both implementation and non-implementation villages expressing
extremely high levels of trust in elders and religious authorities, exceeding 90% (Figure
62).
Although youth has the general reputation of being most critical and potentially re-
bellious, the evaluation found that adults over 34 years in Somaliland and Puntland are
more sceptical towards formal institutions while customary institutions are widely trusted
by both youth and adults. In implementation villages over 91% young people under 35
years express their trust in formal institutions compared to 86% of adults trusting the
VC and 85% of adults trusting the VC. Although the discrepancy between youth and
adults in non-implementation villages is smaller and not significant, the evaluation found
no evidence that Hogaan had a particular effect on young people with respect to trust.
Customary institutions are widely (>90%) and equally trusted by both youth and adults
(Figure 83).
Clan affiliation of respondents had no significant effect on governance trust measures.
A nearly equal percentage of people from minority and majority clans express their trust
towards formal as well as customary institutions (Figure 73).
Conclusion: Hogaan’s Impact on Local Governance
There is evidence that Hogaan had an impact on local level governance. In particular,
there was a clear increase in citizens’ trust and confidence in the capacities of the Village
Council. Citizens in implementation villages were more likely to attribute responsibility
for all services and the protection of all rights to the VC (ranging from security provision,
development and service delivery through to resource management and conflict resolu-
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tion). By itself, this increase in confidence in the VC conforms to the general CDD/R aim
of increasing villagers’ self-reliance, and in the case of Hogaan especially to strengthen
their ability to self-govern. However, this shift in each case comes at the cost of the DC
and therefore does not support villagers’ confidence in the governance capacities and re-
sponsibilities of the state. Despite this, the evaluation did not find evidence of adverse
effects on vertical linkages between the villages and districts or regions. While villagers
seem to attribute more responsibilities and tasks to the VC and fewer to the DC this does
not translate to a lack of trust or confidence of citizens in the district authorities. At the
same time, local leaders in implementation villages overwhelmingly report that they have
improved their relations with the district.17
Although the programme shifted citizens’ (but not leaders’) perceptions of governance
responsibilities from the district to the village, the evaluation did not consider this as
clarification of roles and responsibilities of the different village institutions. We did not
find evidence of either a systematic shift towards formal institutions or of co-ordinated
shift of both citizens’ and leaders’ views. The evaluation also did not find evidence that
Hogaan strengthened the service delivery capacity of local authorities. Respondents in
implementation villages rated service delivery, planning and management capacities of
local authorities fairly similarly to those in non-implementation villages. Given the pro-
gramme’s support for at least two social infrastructure projects in each village (e.g. com-
munity centre, school, etc.), this result is surprising. There is also no evidence that the
programme had an impact on conflicts with the exception of leadership conflicts. As vio-
lence in Somalia and Somaliland is often related to leadership conflicts, the relevance of
this contribution should nonetheless be acknowledged.
3.3 The Survey Experiment
It is sometimes argued that answers to direct survey questions may be misleading because
they tend to elicit responses which are thought to be desirable. Further, preferences given
in answer to direct survey questions may actually be preferences for some other (implicit)
outcome. Both these factors might tend to inflate responses to the evaluation survey in
line with the broad outlook of international organisations. For example, if asked whether
a project should be organised by the VC or by the Clan, respondents may claim that they
prefer a project organised by the VC because they directly think that this is the desired
answer. They might reach the same answer because their actual preference is for projects
which are funded by international organisations, and they think that a project organised
by the VC has a better prospect of receiving funding. Discrete choice experiments are
designed to address these sources of bias. In these experiments respondents are asked to
choose between options with a number of different attributes. The inclusion of a number of
different attributes, which may differ in social desirability, greatly reduces the tendency
towards desirable answers. At the same time bias from factors that may be implicitly
driving choice (such as sources of funding) can be examined by including these factors as
an explicit attribute.
The evaluation overall sought to examine if the intervention had an impact on vil-
lagers preferences and, if so, if the intervention strengthened citizens’ confidence in local
17We also acknowledge the GPC interpretation of the shift from the VC to the DC which they understand
as reflecting the strengthening of the link between the VC and the DC as villagers now turn directly
to the VC
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institutions. In order to examine if our regular survey responses were mainly driven either
directly by the tendency to give socially desirable answers or indirectly by giving prefer-
ences which were believed to be more likely to be in line with the funding priorities of
international organisations, the evaluation team conducted a survey experiment. The ex-
periment aimed at gauging practical preferences of villagers and local authorities around
the organization of projects, with a number of different attributes, one of which was the
source of funding.
The experiment was guided by
Hypothesis 1: that the intervention has altered citizens’ preference on the actors re-
sponsible for managing and implementing development projects
Hypothesis 2: that respondents in implementation villages articulate preferences to-
wards the VC
Taking the example of building a water catchment to prevent effects of recurrent droughts,
respondents were asked to express their project preferences. They could select between
two projects that differed in the actor that organised the building and the actor respon-
sible for maintenance. The project thus had each two attributes, built by and maintained
by, with randomly varying answers for each attribute. Answers included
Build by: the water catchment will be built by
• an enthusiastic group of villagers.
• clan elders
• the Village Council
• the District Commission and Government
• an International Organisation
Maintained by: the water catchment will be maintained
• as need arises
• by your clan
• by the Village Council
In order to assess if financial information has an additional or maybe the prime influence
on project choices, interviewees were given differing information about the financing of
the project. Each interviewee was given the same financial information for all projects, so
finance attribute did not vary between projects. There were three different levels to the
finance attribute:
• Finances were not mentioned in describing the projects
• An international organisation provides the funding
• An international organisation provides funding, but citizens are required to con-
tribute 20%.
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3.3.1 Findings
The results indicate the impact of different answers for both attributes on project choice.
Answers on built by’ question are compared with the baseline category, an enthusiastic
group of villagers. The baseline category for maintenance is as needs arises’, thus that the
water catchment is maintained as needs arises.
Figure 39 shows the main results of the project preferences for citizens (Figure 39a) and
local leaders (Figure 39b) in implementation villages. There is some consistent structure to
citizens’ responses with respect to the question of who should be responsible for building
the catchment. The least favoured option is by an enthusiastic group of villagers. A project
built by the VC is 9% more likely to be selected than one built by the enthusiastic villagers.
However, citizens had less clear preferences between other options, with projects built
by international organisations, DC and clan elders are all about 14% more likely to be
selected.
With respect to maintenance of the catchment, respondents were least likely to choose
a project which is maintained as need arises. Compared to this, the option that the clan
maintains the catchment was 4% more likely to be selected. However, most people were
in favour of the VC, an option that was 10% more likely to be selected.
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Figure 39: Citizens and Leaders Preferences in Hogaan Villages from Survey Experiment
Local leaders (Figure 39b) also articulated clear preferences. As in the household survey,
the least favoured option was that the catchment is built by a group of enthusiastic
villagers. They had an approximately equal preference for the international organisation,
my clan and the VC. Compared to the baseline category, these options were about 15%
more likely to be selected. However, village leaders’ clear preference was for projects
built by the DC and the Government, an option that leaders were 32% more likely to
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select than projects built by an enthusiastic group of villagers. In contrast to the citizens,
village leaders had no clear preference with respect to maintenance. This indicated that
their selection was mainly driven by the building of the catchment while the maintenance
of the water catchment did not significantly affect leaders’ project choice.
3.3.2 Comparison with Non-implementation Villages
As shown in Figure 40 there is no significant difference between the project and the
comparison villages neither with respect to who should build the project nor with respect
to maintenance.
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Figure 40: Citizens Preferences from Survey Experiment, Comparison of Hogaan and Non-
implementation Villages
3.3.3 Impact of Financial Information on Project Preferences
The second analysis is driven by the question: did financial information change preferences,
and if so in which direction?
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Figure 41: Citizens Preferences with and without Financial Information from Survey Experiment
The results shown in Figure 41 provide support for the view that financial information
changes citizens’ preferences. When villagers were informed about where the finances for
the project were coming from, they were significantly more likely to select enthusiastic
villagers for the building of the catchment, albeit that the enthusiasts remained the least
favoured option. Compared to the enthusiasts, people were still more likely to choose clan
elders (13% more likely than enthusiasts), the DC (12%), or an international organisation
(10%). The VC remained the second least preferred choice, but was still 7% more likely to
be chosen than the enthusiasts. There was a particularly large shift towards a preference
for international organisations building the project when villagers were not provided with
financial information. The provision of financial information did not affect the preferences
of local leaders. The different specification of financial arrangements, whether all finance
was provided by an international organization or that a contribution was required had no
effect on the answers of either citizens or village leaders.
Conclusion: Summary of survey experiment results
The overall pattern of responses shows that there are some important differences between
village leaders and citizens. In terms of project organization, village leaders more clearly
prefer projects organized by formal institutions, and particularly by the DC and govern-
ment. At the same time, citizens’ preferences are affected by information about project
maintenance whilst village leaders’ preferences are not. We found evidence that project
preferences were affected by the provision of financial information. Projects implemented
by international organisations are more likely to be chosen when no information about
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funding is given, which suggests that villagers prefer to organise projects without ex-
ternal support, but lack resources to do so. However, we did not find evidence that the
programme significantly affected project choice, and certainly not that it enhanced confi-
dence of villagers in locally governing institutions, with preferences for both VC building
and maintenance if anything slightly higher in non-implementation villages. This therefore
increases our confidence in the validity of the main evaluation.
3.4 Training Effects
As stated in Section 1.3 the provision of training, here understood broadly and ranging
from consultations and content specific workshops to learning by doing, are considered a
core mechanism of CDD/R. In order to determine effects of training on participation and
governance measures, respondents were asked if they participated in training provided by
the programme, and if so in what training. For the analysis of training effects, respondents
were clustered into five different types of training recipients, and their responses in the
analysis were compared with response patterns in non-implementation villages.
The groups are:
1. CAP: People engaged in Community Action Planning (238 respondents)
2. Train: people who engaged in specific training sessions but not in CAP (136 re-
spondents)
3. Community Entry: people who engaged in Community Entry but not CAP or
training (109 respondents)
4. Other: people who were engaged with the project in some other way, but not in
CAP, training, or Community Entry (99 respondents)
5. None: Respondents in Hogaan Villages who did not receive any type of training
and were not engaged with the project (794 respondents)
6. Non-implementation: people in non-implementation villages (228).
The analysis of training effects shows clear patterns. People who have received training
are significantly more likely to attend community and VC meetings, and are more in-
volved in village planning. The highest attendance rates are displayed by respondents
who participated in CAP. Interestingly, people who have not participated in trainings are
even 9-10% less likely to attend such meetings than people in non-implementation villages
(Figure 42).
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Figure 42: Training Effects on Participation (1/2)
Training participants also interact significantly more with locally governing institutions:
over 30% more with the VC; over 28% more with the DC; over 26% more with elders, and
over 21% more with religious authorities. While people without training in implementation
villages had approximately the same level of interaction with formal institutions (VC
and DC) than people in the non-implementation villages, significantly fewer people (-
9%) without training interacted with customary authorities. They are also most critical
towards the responsiveness of customary institutions, albeit they overwhelmingly rated
elders and religious leaders as accessible and do not differ in this view from training
participants or from people in non-implementation villages (Figure 43).
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Figure 43: Training Effects on Participation (2/2)
Respondents who have received training are, in general, also more satisfied with service
delivery and management capacities of the VC and DC, again with the exception of peo-
ple who merely participated in community entry. Respondents from the latter group have
comparable views to people without training from implementation villages and respon-
dents from non-implementation villages.
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Figure 44: Training Effects on Service Delivery
With respect to perceptions of inclusion of marginalised groups, people who have merely
participated in community entry tend to be the most critical. While not significantly differ-
ent from respondents in non-implementation villages, people who participated exclusively
in Hogaan’s community entry are least convinced of all respondents in implementation
villages (including people without Hogaan training) that village planning actually in-
cludes women, youth or caste members. Again members from marginalised groups who
only participated in community entry are least convinced that their own group is in-
volved in planning (Figures 51-53). Another similar pattern with respect to community
entry participants can be detected with respect to views on equality norms. Respondents
from this group are least convinced about equality norms. Compared to respondents from
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non-implementation villages, significantly fewer community entry participants think that
women(-21%), youth (-26%), and caste groups (-12%) should have equal rights. The pat-
terns detected are in some respects clearly contrary to the aims of community entry and
may indicate a selection effect, that is that those people who were involved in community
entry but did not receive any other form of training were specifically excluded either be-
cause they hold particular views and behaviours which were identified as not productive
for further engagement during community entry, or they have self-excluded due to their
unfavourable views towards the programme or for other reasons. People who have partici-
pated in the CAP process, on the other hand, are more likely to think that equal rights of
marginalised groups are already realised, but nonetheless not more convinced that youth,
women or outcasts actually should have equal rights.
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Figure 45: Training Effects on Women’s Rights
A similar pattern is also detected on institutional inclusiveness. Asked which institutions
consider priorities of marginalised groups, community entry participants are much more
critical of all institutions, but particularly when assessing inclusiveness of elders. The same
applies to trust measures. They can be contrasted with people who have participated in
the CAP, and who are significantly more likely to believe that elders and formal insti-
tutions actually consider viewpoints of all marginalised groups. The CAP process thus
either seems to have had a large impact on how participants rate inclusion, or those who
believed that institutions were inclusive were particularly selected to participate in the
CAP, or some combination of the two. The same applies with respect to trust in local
institutions. Again, people who participated in trainings, with the exception of commu-
nity entry participants, are far more likely to trust the formal institutions. Here, however
training and participation did not affect trust in customary institutions. The general neg-
ative pattern with respect to people who participated merely in community entry is again
strongly suggestive of a selection effect.
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Figure 46: Training Effects on Institutional Inclusion (1/2)
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Figure 47: Training Effects on Institutional Inclusion (2/2)
3.4.1 Spillover
The evaluation was not designed to assess spillover effects. However, the above analysis
also provides evidence relevant to understanding spillover. The different groups can be
thought of as either directly treated or affected through spillover by the programme.
Directly Treated Groups: Including all of those who directly participated in the Hogaan
programme (CAP, Training, Community Entry, Other).
Within Project Spillover: Individuals in implementation villages who did not partic-
ipate in the programme individually.
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Between Village Spillover: Individuals in non-implementation villages.
Given the available data it is not possible to provide a watertight case either for or
against the presence of spillover. Many complex patterns of spillover can be imagined,
and spillover stands in a complex relationship with selection effects. Nevertheless, specific
spillover mechanisms do create alternative expectations about the patterns of attitudes
we would expect to observe between these different groups. Below we outline three basic
mechanisms and resulting patterns; we then consider how these relate to our observations.
Complete spillover: expected observation on different treatment groups: no observable
differences between groups.
Partial spillover: based on features such as proximity and contact. Expected observa-
tion: gradient effect, with greatest effect on treated individuals, intermediate im-
pact on untreated individuals in treated villages, lowest impact on individuals in
untreated villages.
No spillover: impact of programme only on treated individuals. Expected observation:
treated individuals significantly different than others, but no significant difference
between untreated individuals in treated and untreated villages.
In general, the patterns in the observed data conform most closely to the expectations
generated by the hypothesis of no spillover. There is a positive difference between treated
individuals and untreated groups, but no positive difference between untreated individuals
in Hogaan villages and those in non-implementation villages. Consider for example the
14 measures shown in Figures 42, 43, and 44. All of these conform most closely to the no
spillover expectation. In every case some, or all, of the treated groups have significantly
more positive responses, which rules out complete spillover. Neither are the observations
consistent with partial spillover, as there is no significant positive difference between the
untreated individuals in the Hogaan villages and those in non-implementation villages
(there is no significant difference in nine cases, and a significant negative difference in five
cases). We do not rule out the possibility of some spillover. However, we consider that
there is moderately strong evidence against spillover being an explanation of the broad
patterns found in the data.
Conclusion: Training or Selection Effects?
The evaluation found a very clear relationship between participation in the programme
and the positive opinions of respondents of village level governance. The more intensive
engagement people have had with the programme, the more satisfied they are in general
with village level governance. People who have participated in the CAP, that is citizens
and local authorities who underwent the long process of identifying and prioritising needs
and suggesting projects, were the most supportive of local governance institutions and
procedure. It is possible that these views are caused by the programme. However, the
existence of these relationships between training or engagement with the programme and
high levels of satisfaction, does not by itself demonstrate causal direction. It is equally
possible that holding these positive opinions of village level governance causes people to
be selected for trainings (See Section 4.3). People who were involved in community entry,
that is were informed by the international organisation about the programme and have
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discussed it with them, but have not participated in any other trainings, show similar
answer patterns than those who were not trained. This general pattern hints at a selec-
tion effect. Community entry people were either excluded from further engagement with
Hogaan by relevant programme stakeholders or they have excluded themselves, be it be-
cause they were not convinced about the programme’s goals or methods or for any other
reasons. An alternative explanation could be that Hogaan entry has sensitized people to
the shortcomings of local government, and thus influenced a particular negative view on
inclusion, decision-making and capacities of local government, which were not mitigated
by later trainings. More important, is the finding that people who had not participated
in programme activities hold attitudes and recalled behaviours that were very similar to
those found in non-implementation villages, but different from those who had individually
participated in the programme. On this basis it seems unlikely that this broad pattern
of results is explained by any straightforward pattern of spillover effect of trainings to
non-participants.
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Chapter 4
Summary and Discussion of Findings
This chapter provides a summary of the detailed findings of the evaluation from the previ-
ous chapter with respect to participation, village governance, and training and selection.
Following the summary, the chapter concludes with a systematic quantitative overview of
the detailed quantitative findings, to address concerns about the cherry-picking of results.
4.1 Hogaan’s Impact on Participation
The evaluation found mixed evidence for programme effects on citizens’ participation
in local level governance. The programme improved interaction of villagers with formal
governing bodies and increased responsiveness of the Village Council and District Council
(from the viewpoint of villagers). The evaluation however found no evidence that the
intervention had an overall effect on other participation measures, such as participation of
citizens in village planning or other decision-making processes. Additionally the capacity
or willingness of citizens to raise demands was not improved by the Hogaan intervention.
Given the priority and effort Hogaan puts into sensitizing villagers to demand services
and, especially during village entry and the CAP process, to participate in planning, this
result may be somewhat disappointing.
Evidence that the Hogaan intervention increased participation of women, youth, or
occupational caste groups is weak. Women and young people continue to have lower par-
ticipation rates in meetings and interact much less with all local institutions. While the
intervention does not appear to have strengthened participation of women or of young
people in decision-making, there is evidence that it increased interaction between women
and customary authorities, and strengthened young people’s ability to articulate demands.
Due to the small number of caste respondents, the evaluation was not able to determine
an intervention effect on occupational castes, but it established that caste members par-
ticipate much less in meetings and are least involved in decision-making processes.
One factor that might explain the limited impact of the programme on participa-
tion is the lack of clarification about which forms of participation were envisaged. With
the collapse of the state, elders have taken over many governance functions in Somalia
and Somaliland. Through the segmentary lineage (clan) system all Somalis are at least
theoretically represented by elders, and therefore, perhaps indirectly, participate in the
decision-making process. Consultation and information sharing are participatory mecha-
nisms that are commonly practiced by elders. Hogaan seems to have built on these already
widely available mechanisms and expanded them to formal institutions, especially to the
Village Council. This had a positive effect on how citizens perceive formal governance at
village and also at district level, but did not automatically promote citizens’ ‘voice’ and
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‘choice’ with respect to village planning or other forms of decision-making. The relation
between the form of participation and the goal of increasing voice and choice of citizens
needs additional elaboration. Increased interaction between citizens and the local institu-
tions do not necessarily give citizens more voice or affect how they assess responsiveness
of these institutions or how satisfied they are with them. Although, for example, women
interact much less with the VC than men, they rate accessibility and responsiveness quite
similarly. If anything, then, women are slightly more satisfied with the VC, despite being
much less involved in village planning and decision-making. A similar pattern is evident
with respect to youth. Their participation in meetings is lower and they interact signif-
icantly less with the VC than adults, but nonetheless have higher appreciation for the
VC’s capacities.
Although not intended by the programme (at least not explicitly so), the intervention
had an effect on participation of minority clans in local governance. Governance in Somalia
and Somaliland is largely clan based, and numerical strength of clans in the village is
reflected in the number of representatives in the VC. Numerical strength is also mirrored
in other forms of participation, such as contributions or benefit sharing. It is thus not
surprising that clan minorities, here defined as people from numerically smaller clan groups
in a particular location, have lower levels of participation and are less involved in decision-
making than people from majority groups. The programme however had a positive effect
and increased participation of people from minority clans in planning processes. It also
increased their interaction with customary authorities.
The programme had a large impact on the perception of villagers, and especially so
on the perception of governance inclusiveness. While there is overall limited evidence
that marginalized individuals are more likely to participate in decision-making, people in
implementation villages are significantly more convinced than their counterparts in non-
implementation villages that marginalised groups are included in decision-making and
planning processes. This may well be a result of the advocacy and discussions initiated
by Hogaan. The intervention also had an effect on the responsiveness of local institu-
tions. Villagers in implementation villages were more convinced that their viewpoints are
considered, especially by formal authorities.
The programme did not have a positive impact on the promotion of equality norms,
and may have negatively impacted on the norms surrounding gender and youth equality. It
did, however, sensitize local leaders to priorities of marginalised groups, although, similarly
to ordinary citizens, most leaders are convinced that inclusion is already realised.
4.2 Hogaan’s Impact on Village Level Governance
The Hogaan programme had a significant impact on local level governance. The evalu-
ation found systematic evidence that the project has increased citizens’ reliance on the
Village Council and also increased trust in it. Interestingly, this change is not fully mir-
rored in how citizens access the VC’s governance capacities. While they have a higher
apprehension for the VC’s management capacity, citizens did not change their views on
the VC’s ability to provide services or its accountability. With respect to conflict manage-
ment, the Hogaan intervention had little overall impact but contributed to the resolution
of leadership conflicts.
The evaluation did not find evidence that the programme succeeded in clarifying gov-
ernance roles and responsibilities, nor did it systematically change the balance between
formal and traditional institutions. It did nevertheless expand citizens’ view of the remit
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of the VC relative to the responsibilities of the district government and thus the state.1
While this shift is in line with the general CDD/R aim of increasing villagers’ confi-
dence in self-government and abilities to self-govern, it also creates the risk of neglecting
the responsibilities of the state. Given that governance is already ‘radically localized’
(Menkhaus) throughout Somalia and (although to a lesser extent) Somaliland, the eval-
uation team would like to hint at the risk of interventions to contribute to the further
localisation of governance, and to the tension this could produce for the more general aim
of statebuilding. However, it is important to emphasize that the evaluation did not find
any evidence that would suggest other adverse effects on vertical links between village,
district and region. While villagers seem to attribute more responsibilities and tasks to
the VC and less to the DC, this does not translate to a lack of trust or confidence of
citizens in the district authorities. On the contrary, respondents in Hogaan villages have
higher levels of trust in the DC, although they assign less responsibilities to the district.
More importantly local leaders in implementation villages overwhelmingly report that
they have improved their relations with the district.
4.3 Training and Selection Effects
There are very clear relationships between participation in the programme and positive
opinions of village level governance. The more intensive engagement people have had with
the programme the more satisfied they were in general with village level governance. It is
possible that these relationships are caused by the programme. However, the existence of
these relationships does not by itself demonstrate causal direction. It is equally possible
that holding these positive opinions of village level governance causes people to be selected
for training. While many people during the qualitative research emphasized for example
that all segments of the village community among them men, women, youth, rich and
poor are involved in village decision-making, further discussions revealed that they are
often not directly involved but through representatives, mostly elders (See Section 3.1.1).
Some interviewees equally emphasized that the village community participated in the
Hogaan intervention. However, many villagers do not automatically feel entitled to par-
ticipate in meetings or training, but wait until they are explicitly approached by a local
leader, be it an elder, VC member or member of a development committee (and often
enough they are invited because an international organisation demands it). Chances of
people, and especially women and young people, to be invited seem to be higher if they
are organised in community groups or other organisations, as elders or the VC tend to
approach organisations when they mobilise people for specific activities. See the following
interview sections that indicate that membership in an organisation can facilitate partici-
pation in the project. Often it is the chairpersons of community-based organisations who
are invited to represent the wider group. A young man, for example, listed some of the
people that participated in Hogaan initiated village planning sessions:
Those who participate included the chairman, and the secretary of the village,
chairlady of the women organization, chairman of the youth organization and
representatives from the business community and some of the Odayasha (el-
ders).
1 It is noteworthy here that local leaders do not show the same tendency to shift responsibility to the
VC.
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Several interviewers indicated that membership in local organisations enables and en-
courages participation. It also enhances the chances that own issues and concerns are
addressed, and helps members of these groups to receive a share in the benefits of the
projects (participation in benefits). For example, the following is an answer of an elder
who was asked if youth and women participate in decision-making:
Yes, they have a youth organizations that is very well organized, they raised
and collected contributions among themselves, and they took a big share in the
construction of the Mother Child Health Centre.
Interviewer: What about women?
They have their organization as well, and they take part in all the necessary
issues.
In order to assess if membership in a community based organisation (CBO) supports
participation, the survey collected data on the organisational membership of respondents.
The date provides very clear results: people who are organised were 30% more likely to
participate in the Hogaan programme and 17% more likely to receive information about
it.
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Figure 48: Group Membership and Participation in Hogaan Programme
Based on these findings, it is likely that the programme, instead of increasing inclusiveness,
mainly worked through people who were already quite active and already participated to
some extent in decisions that concerned the village or at least their particular group in
the village. While this does not necessarily influence the project negatively, the lack of
inclusion or the self-exclusion of other people needs further assessment. Self-exclusion is
usually not addressed in participatory processes (Cornwall 2008: 279), but can lead to
frustration and have negative impacts for the programme. This is also suggested by the
finding that people who were involved in community entry but have not participated in
any other trainings, are the least satisfied with local governance.
While people who participated in the programme had very different views and be-
haviour, people who did not participate at all in programme activities generally held atti-
tudes and recalled behaviours which were very similar to those found in non-implementation
villages. The evaluation could thus not detect a spillover effect to non-participants.
4.4 Systematic Overall Summary of Findings
In order to further address concerns about cherry-picking results we also present a sum-
mary analysis. Rather than looking at each outcome from the survey individually we
group them together and examine whether there is an overall pattern across the questions
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collectively. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the analysis which shows the overall effect
and whether there was a significant change in the differential for women, minority clans
and young people. The stars in the table indicate statistical significance of the model
parameters.2
Overall Gender Clan Youth
Participation: Formal *** - * -
Participation: Customary - - ** *
Participation Overall ** - ** -
Perception Minorities Involved *** - - -
Inclusion Overall - - - -
Formal Institutions Strengthened - ** - -
Service Provision - - - -
Governance Trust ** - - -
Overall Governance - - - -
Issue Resolution - - - -
Table 4.1: Overall Summary of Quantitative Evaluation of Hogaan Project
Outcome 1: Participation We find systematic evidence for an effect on overall levels
of participation, driven by greater engagement with formal institutions. We also find evi-
dence that the project has led to significant improvement in the participation of minority
clans (not outcast groups). We do not find systematic evidence that there has been an
improvement in the participation of women or youth.
Outcome 1: Inclusion of women, youth and minority clans Looking at patterns
of participation across all measures we do not find systematic evidence for an effect on
the inclusion of women, young people or minority clans with village institutions.
Outcome 2: Co-ordination and Administration [through strengthening of for-
mal governance institutions] Looking across all measures of co-ordination and ad-
ministration we do not find systematic evidence of a programme effect on the overall
population although women are significantly more supportive of formal institutions in
implementation villages.
Outcome 2: Service Delivery We do not find systematic evidence of a programme
effect.
Outcome 2: Conflict Management We do not find systematic evidence of a pro-
gramme effect. While no overall improvement is registered, it is noteworthy that system-
atic evidence was found on the resolution of leadership conflicts.
2 The summary is calculated with a multi-level linear regression using the standard model on the mean
number of positive responses across all questions in the category. The stars in the table indicate whether
the inclusion of the relevant parameter leads to a significant increase in the goodness of fit of the model
using an anova F-test.
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Chapter 5
Recommendations Relating to the Theory of Change
To suggest an alternative ToC would imply suggesting alternative objectives (what), mech-
anisms (how) and/or to target or partner with an alternative group of people (who). It
would address the questions of which objectives would have been more realistic, which
mechanisms would have worked better and whether the programme should have chosen a
different target population. Instead of suggesting substantive alternatives to goal setting,
implementation and partnerships, we suggest that it would be more fruitful to rethink
how the three elements should be developed.
Two broad and well established points underpin our recommendations:
1. Be context specific: Take the context into account in more detail in all three
components of the ToC: the objectives (participation, inclusion, good governance),
the mechanisms (participation, learning by doing and training) and the target group
(communities, women, youth, minorities).
2. Enhance clarity through specificity (Cohen and Uphoff 1980:) Following Cohen
and Upphoff (1980:214) we suggest that participatory approaches should specify the
meaning of participation with respect to 1) the kind of participation 2) the question
of who is supposed to participate and 3) how participation is supposed to occur (on
which level, direct or indirect).
The following sections explain how these recommendations could be applied in the context
of the Hogaan and other participatory programmes in Somalia and Somaliland.
Recommendations 1: Increase Focus without Losing Specificity
Hogaan’s original ToC was reviewed and adapted with the intention of increasing pro-
gramme focus and thus making impact manageable, and being able to monitor purposes
(See Figures in Appendix C). The revised theory of change did reduce the number of
outcomes from five to two. However, simply reducing the number of outcomes was not
sufficient to focus the project in central respects. It is the case that some of the outcomes
were explicitly dropped (particularly those relating to the relationship between the vil-
lages and the DC and regional policy change). However, many outputs and outcomes were
now grouped together into much shorter, but as a consequence also less specific, goals. For
example, in the original ToC, one outcome was the village level institutions demonstrating
an ability to manage development funds in a transparent and equitable way, and another
was village institution being able to advocate more effectively at the district level. In the
replacement ToC one of the specified outcomes is that village institutions are able to plan,
manage and co-ordinate. This is a shorter formulation, but is much more general, in fact
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completely encompassing both of the outcomes from the original ToC and much more be-
sides. Further, even where outcomes were dropped from the ToC the aspects connected to
them remained in the programme. For example conflict management was originally con-
sidered a separate outcome. While it was dropped as an outcome in favour of a shift to
accountability, transparency and responsiveness of governance, conflict resolution training
still remained part of the mechanism suggested to contribute to this outcome. The ToC
thus displays a high degree of vagueness with respect to both the outcomes themselves
and the pathway or logic of change, as it is not clear which activities and outputs are
actually meant to catalyse which type of change.
Another example for this vagueness is the dropping of mechanisms for increasing re-
sponsiveness of local institutions. While the original ToC at least specified, for example,
the output that citizens have access to formal mechanisms of engagement with village
institutions’ (failing to clarify the kind of mechanisms or what is meant by formal), the
new ToC does not provide any mechanism at all, and instead just states that citizens’ en-
gagement and participation will increase responsiveness. To conclude, we fully agree with
the attempt to increase focus (and also with the dropping of many outcomes including
conflict management). However, we suggest that the programme needs to better specify
the sequences of change and to fine-tune the logic in which the sequences are supposed to
build on each other.
Recommendation 2: Adapt implementation practice to context
The Hogaan programme used a fairly standardised CDD/R approach (see also section
1.3). It put considerable effort into working with different village groups and applied a
broad range of participatory tools (Venn diagram, community mapping, seasonal calendar,
income/poverty analysis, SWOT analysis etc.) to stimulate discussion about villagers’
needs and ways to address them. Despite these attempts, the outcomes of the needs
analysis and priority development are nonetheless surprisingly uniform, and reveal a clear
priority from villagers of the building of community centres. In all, villagers chose 28
community centres, 18 schools, 10 health centres and 9 Berkets.
A second quite uniform approach was chosen for the distribution of block grants. The
village was constructed as a uniform object of the programme, and an equal amount of
money was released to each village independent of, for example, its size (the number of
households varies considerable) or the prioritised project. Urban areas were divided into
sections but despite obvious differences were otherwise treated in a very similar way to
villages, and the standard implementation procedure applied with the delivery of an equal
grant for each section of the village. The following table indicates the mismatch between
the size of the funds and the size of the village (number of households). The fact that the
numbers of households is difficult to estimate is already indicated in the table, as we have
included three different estimates in the second row, one extracted from the programme
documents (Prog Docs),1 the other from the satellite maps we used for the randomisation
experiment, the last from estimates of the Survey Supervisors (Survey Super). We use
the survey supervisors’ estimate to calculate the investment per household (app. Invest
1 Please note that for several villages we found quite different estimates in the documents. If available we
chose to use the number in the CAP document. However, this points to an issue with the management
of data. Crucial data is spread across a different reports, some of them very detailed and well devel-
oped, others clearly suffering from copy/paste errors. There would be considerable benefits to a more
systematic approach to the storage and distribution of key administrative and management data.
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per HH), not because we think that the supervisors’ estimates are the most accurate but
because the supervisors provided estimates of every village.
Household Size Estimates
Prog. Satellite Survey app. Invest
District Village Docs Maps Super per HH
Burtinle Jalam 1300 5000 $3
Galkayo Badweyn 3000 5000 $3
Galkayo Harfo 3000 3000 $6
Galkayo Bursaalax 3900 1696 1500 $11
Galkayo City (X/Garsoor) 1500 1000 $17
Galkayo City (Hormar4) 1500 1000 $17
Burtinle Kalabayr 380 900 $19
Galkayo City (Israc) 1500 800 $21
Burtinle Town (Wadajir) 580 $29
Burtinle Town (Horumar) 500 550 $31
Burtinle Town (Hawlwadag) 500 530 $32
Burtinle Town (Israac) 530 $32
Galkayo Balisbule 1800 453 500 $34
Erigabo Yube 360 203 500 $34
Erigabo Carmala 800 450 $38
Erigabo Mait 300 158 400 $42
Erigabo Godmobias 200 289 400 $42
Galkayo Sallah 320 $53
Galkayo Bayra 500 300 $57
Galkayo Agaran 700 200 $85
Erigabo City (Shacab) 200 $85
Erigabo Damal Hagare 320 273 200 $85
Erigabo Yufle 260 150 $113
Erigabo City (Daya’an) 1000 150 $113
Erigabo City (Hafad Somale) 850 150 $113
Erigabo Godcaanood 350 60 120 $142
Erigabo Shimbirale 200 121 100 $170
Galkayo Balanbal 500 205 75 $227
Burtinle Maga’ley 350 70 $243
Burtinle Godobyar 90 62 $274
Burtinle Faratooyo 180 60 $283
Burtinle Meygagle 250 60 $283
Galkayo Malaasle 300 60 $283
Burtinle Ballidacar 80 55 $309
Burtinle Megag 70 54 $315
Burtinle Xaarxaar 200 103 50 $340
Burtinle Birta Dheer 100 94 50 $340
Galkayo Beer Dhagaxtuur 300 31 50 $340
Galkayo Roox 300 111 50 $340
Erigabo Daryle 100 50 $340
Erigabo Rugey 50 42 50 $340
Erigabo Goof 190 50 $340
Burtinle Hayanle 80 45 $378
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Galkayo Qalanqal 150 45 $378
Burtinle Bahaley 75 74 40 $425
Burtinle Koryal 40 $425
Erigabo Jidali 250 111 40 $425
Erigabo Ardaa 100 35 $486
Burtinle Farjano small 33 $515
Burtinle Birrecaad 70 19 30 $567
Galkayo Dhagaxyo Cado 100 30 $567
Erigabo Biyoguduud 100 63 30 $567
Erigabo Buq 80 30 $567
Burtinle Lacle 17 25 $680
Galkayo Darusalam 80 25 $680
Erigabo Sibaayo 150 45 25 $680
Erigabo Dibqarax 80 45 24 $708
Galkayo Bilcil 100 42 20 $850
Galkayo Adaygebagebo 150 3 $5667
Table 5.1: Village Size Estimates
The size of some villages varies considerable due to seasonal migration. Some of the smaller
villages are completely abandoned during the dry season as pastoralists move to other
places in search for pasture and water. This explains, for example, the household size of
Adaygebagebo in the above table (5.1). When the enumerators arrived in Adaygebagebo,
they only found a few older men who were left behind to protect the property, while
all other villagers were on the move. While most of them likely came back, seasonal
migration impacts not only on village size, but also influences governance and politics more
widely. The effects of seasonal migration on village governance, including service provision,
management and maintenance of projects etc., were not discussed by the programme and
are thus not considered in the change logic. The Hogaan programme should hence think
through the impact of seasonal migration on village governance and the impact of mobility
on governance more generally.
The uniformity of approaches and outcomes raises some doubts about the community-
driven nature of the programme. We acknowledge that the uniformity in the selection of
projects can have many reasons: villages are likely to face similar problems; some of the
prioritised projects can be supported by the implementing organisation under another
programme title2; the grants were not sufficient for other projects; some projects are
excluded by the organisations; a tendency of villages to copy each other; etc. However, the
uniformity of outcomes points to more general or structural constraints between the need
to standardize approaches (to get the work done or to scale up) and the localised nature of
community-driven work. The donor related need to pre-design outcomes and approaches
even if local knowledge is somehow limited creates another challenge for community-driven
work. This general critique indicates the need to increase flexibility of programming and
to adapt the implementation practice to the (changing) context.
Recommendation 3: Specify roles and responsibilities of local institutions
The Hogaan programme conducted a participatory governance assessment and developed
Government Improvement Plans (GIP) for most villages. The GIPs outline strength, weak-
2 This was given as a reason for the uniformity of projects by Care in Erigabo.
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nesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT-analysis) of the VC and provide suggestions for
improvements. The GIP did not include an analysis of all governing institutions, but
concentrated on formal institutions, in particular the VC. Elders were not considered
although elders are acknowledged as important political players in the ToC. Indeed, as
outlined in section 3.2, elders are in many villages responsible for selecting VC members
and are themselves often members. They also enjoy very high levels of trust among the
population. The programme’s failure to include elders in the GIP does not therefore mean
that elders were not integrated in the programme. Rather, it means the programme failed
to specify elders’ role in the programme especially in relation to the VC and the village de-
velopment committee, as well as in relation to the DC. The programme itself did not make
clear the different roles and responsibilities of village level institutions, and thus suffered
from the same lack of clarity it attributes to village governance in Somalia/Somaliland.
Beyond stimulating further discussion on the roles and responsibilities of the different
institutions (among authorities themselves, among citizens and between authorities and
citizens), CDD/R would need to tailor training and capacity-building initiatives to the
specific responsibilities and needs of the different local authorities. To conclude, the pro-
gramme needs to expand its addressees beyond “local government officials” and “selected
village and District Council members”, and to specifically integrate elders and religious
leaders. It also needs to tailor trainings to the specific duties and responsibilities that are
assigned to the particular institutions.
With respect to recommendation 3, it is however necessary to keep in mind that the
differentiation of institutions and offices, the clarification of roles and responsibilities,
and the assignment of clear office portfolios and duties, amount to a formalisation and
bureaucratisation of governance, and thus would imply significant social and political
transformations. Governance in Somalia/Somaliland is performed through overlapping
roles and responsibilities. To de-differentiate and thus to formalise it, if realistic at all,
would need a more careful discussion and conflict sensitive approach, as it would initiate
socio-political transformations that are likely to trigger conflicts.
The general project assumption that current village governance lacks efficiency would
itself require further investigation. It seems that the programme document was influenced
by a liberal view on how governance should work (through formal procedures and pro-
cesses, with policies implemented in a bureaucratic way) rather than by an assessment
of governance problems in Somalia. On one side the ToC criticizes inefficiency, on the
other it acknowledges hybridity, and thus the blend between ideal typically differentiated
governance principles. Governance in Somaliland in Puntland is mostly process oriented
and not focused on outcomes (modern administrations in contrast are outcome oriented),
and may thus be inefficient from a liberal point of view. In the case of Somaliland and
Puntland these forms of governance have nonetheless achieved some considerable success
in peace - as well as statebuilding.3
Recommendation 4: Specify types and modes of participation
Hogaan aimed at increasing participation of citizens in village-level decision-making. How-
ever, the programme did not specify the modes and types of participation it would like
to encourage, but instead used modes of participation that were already in place. The
programme thus failed to move towards the ideal of improving citizens’ voice and choice,
3 Hybridity of course provides some substantial challenges with respect to democratisation. This became
recently quite apparent in Somaliland, cf. for example RVI 2013; APD 2010.
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but multiplied participation types that are already commonly practiced, such as represen-
tation, information sharing and consultation, and built on already available modes of par-
ticipation through, for example, the clan system, CBOs or personal contacting/invitation.
Being informed about a process or even being involved in it does not automatically
lead to having voice and agency. To stimulate a shift from these rather passive to more
interactive forms of participation, the programme needs to specify or to facilitate discus-
sions around the types and modes of participation already practiced, and to outline the
types and modes it envisages. This should include an assessment of the different types
of decisions that are being or should be made, who exactly is involved in which types
of decision-making, and how different stakeholders and villagers more generally could
and should participate in decision-making processes (direct/indirect; passive/selective;
active/interactive), if at all. One focus in these assessments should be on the people who
do not participate, those who are absent or retreat in the course of an activity or project,
and why. On the basis of such an assessment, specific types and modes of participation
could be initiated for the different areas of decision-making and specific hypotheses on
the pathway of change developed.
To give an example: indirect participation through clan-based representation is quite
common in Somalia and Somaliland. Another often and maybe increasingly practiced
form of indirect participation is through community-based organisations (See above sec-
tion 3.1.1). Programmes (sometimes knowingly, sometimes not) tend to rely on the same
representational mechanisms, and thus go, for example, through women groups when they
aim at integrating women into their programmes or through youth groups when approach-
ing young people. The participation of a representative of this group in a meeting is then
used as evidence for women’s or youth’s participation. If, for example, the chairlady of a
women’s group participates in a meeting or programme, organisations seem to assume a)
that the chairlady represents ‘the women’ of the village, b) that the chairlady discusses
decisions to be made with ‘the women’ and reflects this discussion back in the meet-
ings, and c) that she informs ‘the women’ about decisions made. However, exactly these
assumed mechanisms of representational participation would need further specification.
This would enable the programme to build-up a plausible logic of change based on dif-
ferentiated forms and mechanisms of participation. It would also allow the programme to
develop more differentiated pathways of change and would thus help to specify objectives.
Again a note of caution is required. Participation is not simply a technique that can
be stimulated but an inherently political and thus potentially conflictive process. It thus
requires careful and conflict-sensitive considerations, consultation and negotiations with
a broad range of village stakeholders.
Recommendation 5: Specify expected effects of participation
Hogaan additionally seems to assume that participation automatically enhances satis-
faction with decision-making. Again, this assumption would need further investigation.
The evaluation found no evidence that higher rates of engagement with local institutions
significantly changed how respondents assessed either the accessibility or the responsive-
ness of local institutions. For example, women interact much less with both formal and
customary institutions, but nonetheless share the views of men on accessibility and re-
sponsiveness of these institutions. Similar results are found for youth: Although young
people (18-25 years) interact the least frequently with all governing institutions and are
least involved in planning and decision-making, people from this age group are among the
most satisfied with the service delivery, management capacity and management style of
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formal authorities. Indeed older people (>54 years) seem to be the most critical of the
capacities of local authorities. With respect to the Village Council, older people are signif-
icantly less likely than young people to think that the VC can manage projects, and that
the VC handles money transparently and accountably. The differences are even greater
in the assessment of the DC where older people are significantly less likely to think that
the DC provides services, can manage projects, or can handle money transparently and
accountably. This age group also has lowest levels of trust in the VC and DC. Here it
is most likely not their lack of opportunities towards participation, but past experiences
and in Somalia/Somaliland the experience of war and decay of formal institutions that
may contribute to the rather negative view of current forms of governance.
Recommendation 6: Be specific about the addressees
Besides enhancing participation in general, the Hogaan programme aimed at creating
space to enable women, youth and marginalised people’ (ToC document) to participate
in decision-making. Like most programmes, Hogaan relies on collective terms to define its
main addresses, such as ‘the community’, ‘the marginalised’, ‘the women’ or ‘the youth’.
Collective terms are by nature unspecific and amorphous. For example when interviewees
in the villages were requested to define community and to describe what it consists of,
they referred to different characteristics such as location, sharing/contributing, joint ac-
tivities, or social diversity. Location was often used as basic criterion: to live together
in one place is to be part of the community. However, in the same time many people
mentioned the rural hinterlands as part of the village community. Villagers themselves
emphasized the social diversity of communities, often listing differences in sex (men and
women), age (children, youth, elderly) or occupation (business people, herders, politi-
cians, elders). These differentiations included emphasis on the inclusiveness of community
membership. As in other contexts, the notion of community had a normative connotation
in Somalia/Somaliland. Interviewees described communities as people who share work,
have a high degree of co-operation and aim for a peaceful mediation of conflicts, or indeed
who mutually support each other. Already the utilisation of the term thus conceals power
relations and conflicts within the target group. For the purpose of specifying addressees
of a CDD/R project, the utilisation of normatively coloured, collective terms should be
avoided.
The project instead should specify who within the village community is supposed
to participate. To exchange one collective term, such as community, with a series of
others, such as the women, the youth etc. does not enhance clarity. Hogaan works through
representatives, usually assuming that anybody from a particular collective (women, youth
etc.) is indeed representative of it and somehow speaks for it. However, in reality of course
a women or a young man may not feel or act as representative of the women or the youth,
but have closer bonds to their extended families, kin or clan group, to people who have
the same occupation or similar wealth etc. Moreover, people within these collectives may
have radically differing needs and concerns. Women for example may face quite different
challenges with respect to participation depending on their age, wealth, business success,
education, the family they come from and the marriage relations they have entered (or
failed to enter).
Similarly problematic is reference to the collectivity of youth. The ToC states that
youth have limited say in local governance mechanisms [...], that youth are
largely seen as disturbers of the peace or as a labour force, but not as rele-
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vant contributors to community decisions. In most cases, youth are excluded
from Village Councils and District Councils and have little say over village
affairs. They are often bored, have limited access to post-primary education,
and few employment or recreational opportunities. Experience [...] shows that
this, combined with their lack of voice in community governance, leads to con-
siderable frustration, and can escalate into conflict or insecurity.
In Somalia the dominant view identifies youth as potential disturbers, and the document
accepts this. Additionally, the programme document also seems to equate youth with
young men, as young women in Somalia, in comparison to their male counterparts, are
quite busy. Presumably the document does not refer to young women when outlining the
idleness of youth (young women may nonetheless be bored given the absence of recre-
ational opportunities). However, the same equation of youth with young men became
apparent in Somalia. When we asked to be introduced to the youth of the village, we were
usually introduced to young men. After further inquiry if young women are not considered
as youth, the youngsters stated that they of course generally were, but that the consultant
had not particularly requested the inclusion of women. This already indicates the danger
of tokenism, that is representatives from ‘marginalised’ groups are invited to satisfy the
need of the donor. Even if invited, they then often lack voice and power to articulate their
views, let alone to influence decision-making.
Recommendation 7: Address exclusion and discrimination of caste groups sep-
arately
The programme largely failed in even identifying caste members in the villages. It should
thus explore alternative mechanisms that ensure not only identification but also inclusion.
It is often only after repeated inquiry that villagers point to the (often very small number
of) caste members living in the village. The majority of Gabooye/Madhiban interviewed
had either not heard of the programme or if they had, were not invited to participate
either in decision-making or in sharing the benefits.4 Some interviewees from the caste
groups were quite blunt about this discrimination:
This is small village, and everything depends on tribes, certain tribes are seg-
regated and even sometimes they are insulted. We as the minority people, we
don’t get any support from this community.
The quantitative assessment equally confirms the much lower levels of inclusion of
caste groups (Figure 49). If people from these groups are supposed to be included, then
special mechanisms should be developed first to ensure that they are able to participate
at all, and second identifying how they are supposed to participate if the whole culture
of meetings prevents them from being heard. If numbers are sufficient, it may well be
worth first supporting the self-organisation capacities of caste members before starting to
facilitate their inclusion in decision-making.
4 There were exceptions to the latter. In one village in Erigabo, for example, a Madhiban household
received one of the Berkeds that were built.
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Figure 49: Comparison of Clan Groups on Participation in Hogaan Programme
Recommendation 8: Analyse how different forms of contribution impact on
social cohesion
The moral obligation to support community members in distress was in the qualitative
assessment emphasized by many interviewees as a dominant feature of the Somali culture
and constitutive element of communal relations. The moral obligation to support com-
munity members in distress is an important feature of communal relations in Somalia. It
is this moral economy that specifies community boundaries, defines rules of engagement
with and towards the ‘external’, and binds people through mutual obligations and pro-
longed debts.5 Contributions are one of the things that define the realm of inclusion and
exclusion, and circumscribe who is considered a member of a community and who is at
the margins or even excluded.
Three types of contributions were differentiated in the Somali villages:
1. contributions to support poor and needy people (charity);
2. (blood) compensation payments in case on injury and conflict; and
3. support for projects, most commonly the building of mosques but also development
oriented projects.
These contributions are organized differently, the first as need arises and by anybody
who identifies needy people. Several interviewees stressed the important role of women
in the organization of charity. Contributions for (blood) compensation is in contrast ne-
gotiated and organized mainly by elders, while contributions for development involve the
village administration as well as elders. In the case of development projects, committees
are often formed to oversee the organization of contributions and the implementation of
the project. Villagers described different ways on how community contributions for the
CDD/R program under focus were organized. Some villages collected contribution on clan
base, others mainly on basis of wealth and occupation and again others combined both
criteria. Few villagers seemed to have relied mainly on ‘door to door’ collections, without
considering householders’ characteristics. Usually the male member of a household was
requested to contribute, but women with their own income (tea shops, kiosks and restau-
rants in the villages are often run by women) were also requested to donate. Some villagers
who based their contribution on clan affiliation, stressed that majority clans have due to
their numerical strength in the village contributed more (usually double) than people from
numerically less strong clans in the villages.
Based on these findings the evaluation designed and added a module on contributions
to the survey, which included questions on the different types of contributions, frequency
5 Beyond the more moral debt created by gift-exchange, lending money was also regularly mentioned as
indication of communal relations.
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and organisations of contributions. The module aimed at a further understanding of con-
tribution practices, at analysing the potential relationship between community contribu-
tions and project participation, and at evaluating their impact on village level planning
and governance. The evaluation found evidence that contributions are closely related to
perceptions of local governance institutions. For example, people who contribute to so-
cial or development projects are more likely to trust the VC and DC, and acknowledge
their management and planning capacities (See Figure 115). Similar patterns characterise
security related and even blood contributions.
We cannot determine if people contribute more because their trust is higher or if
contribution increases trust, so this finding may not be so surprising. However, a similar
pattern characterises not just security related and but also blood contributions. In ad-
dition, patterns of contribution are substantially affected by international programmes.
While further analysis will be required to draw more than preliminary conclusions, the
results suggest that the way in which people contribute to development projects needs
to be taken into account in more detail. It may well make a difference if, for example,
contributions are organised on clan basis or neighbourhood basis, both options that were
narrated in interviews. The relatively high number of people who do not contribute also
needs further analysis. If there is a causal relationship between contribution and trust,
this would suggest that organisations should thinks carefully about the mechanism used
to collect contributions and take measure to ensure that those who do not contribute are
in some ways supported to do so. Thus our final recommendation is that more considera-
tion should be given to the flow of contributions into the programme, the means by which
these are organised and how the forms of contribution may influence social cohesion.
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Appendix A
Appendix: Data Analysis Plan Results
A.1 Programme Mechanisms Analysis As Identified
in the Data Analysis Plan
The main evaluation of the effects of programme activities is found in Section 4.3. However,
in table 3 of the data analysis plan the evaluation team proposed testing a number of
hypotheses about the effects of programme activities in very specific ways. This section
provides that analysis to deliver on those proposals.
A.1.1 Citizen Participation in decision-making
Sub-Mechanism 1a: Citizen Training
The data analysis plan identified tests against the following four hypotheses relating to
the the training of citizens:
H1 Individual Quantity: Individuals who have been trained under the Hogaan pro-
gramme will be more likely to participate in community forums and decision-making.
H2 Individual Quality: Individuals with higher regard for the Hogaan training they
received will be more likely to participate in community forums and decision-making.
H3 Collective Quantity: Individuals in villages with greater levels of Hogaan indi-
vidual training are more likely to participate in community forums and decision-making.
H4 Collective Quality: Individuals in villages where there is generally a high re-
gard for Hogaan training are more likely to participate in community forums and village
decision-making.
Sub-Mechanism 1b Leadership Training
H5 Leadership Quantity Increases in levels of leadership training increase citizen
participation.
H6 Leadership Quality Villages where leaders found the Hogaan training more useful
will have citizens with a higher probability of participating in community forums.
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H7 Relationship between Sub-Mechanism of Participation Increase: Both in-
dividual and leadership training contribute independently to increasing participation.
A.1.2 Mechanism 2: Strengthening Institutions
H8 Leader Training and Planning Village leadership training related to citizens
perceptions of ability local government’s ability to plan and mange projects.
H9 Leader Training and Service Delivery Village leadership training related to
citizens perceptions of ability local government’s ability to plan and mange projects.
H10 Leader Training and Local Government Overall Village leadership training
related to citizens perceptions of local government overall planning and service delivery.
A.1.3 Data Challenges
The results combine the information from the leadership and the household surveys. This
combination provide useable estimates on the question of whether people have or have
not undertaken various forms of activity. However, in order to gauge the perceived quality
of activities the evaluation directly asked people for their assessment of the quality. There
was almost no variation on these measures, with almost all respondent from in household
and leadership surveys reporting that all the activities that they participated in were
very useful. For example on the leadership survey the most criticised activity was the
training in Civic Education which received no negative comments, three who were unsure
about its utility and 225 positive comments and 1 refusal. The analysis based on these
utility questions is very uninformative, but nevertheless because we included it in the data
analysis plan we follow through with the analysis here.
A.1.4 Overview of Data Analysis Plan Table 3 Results
The regression tables and model comparison results specified in Table 3 of the data analysis
plan can be found in Appendix: Data Analysis Plan Results. The table below gives a
summary of the findings which can be found there relating to the above hypotheses. It
can be seen that we have null findings for six of the ten hypotheses, two of which related to
programme quality. We were unable to test two further hypotheses relating to programme
quality. The evaluation found support for two of the ten hypotheses.
It found support for the theory that participation in programme activities is related to
participation in community meetings. This could be either because people who participate
in community meetings anyway were more likely to participate in the Hogaan programme
or because participation in the programme causes increased participation.
The evaluation also found evidence that that people who live in villages where more
training has taken place are more likely to participate in community meetings. This could
be because there is a spillover effect, such that participation increases when there has
been more engagement in the project across the whole village. However, it could also
be an extension of the finding under H1. In some villages we encounter more people
who participated in the Hogaan programme than in others. If, as in H1, these people
as individuals were we more likely to participate in community meetings then this could
show up as a village level effect. The spillover interpretation is rendered less likely, and
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the individual interpretation more likely, by extending the analysis to include a control
for individual level participation. When this is done village level Hogaan participation is
no longer a significant predictor. The overall findings of this section are consistent with
the other discussion of programme activities, that individual level participation in the
Hogaan programme is positively related to participation in community meetings.
Hypothesis Affecting Sub-Mechanism Slope Significance Conclusion
H1 Individual Quantity Participation Citizen Training +ve *** Evidence for Mechanism
H2 Individual Quality Participation Citizen Training none No Evidence for Mechanism
H3 Village Quantity Participation Citizen Training +ve *** Evidence for Mechanism
H4 Village Quality Participation Citizen Training none No Evidence for Mechanism
H5 Leader Quantity Participation Leaders Training none No Evidence for Mechanism
H6 Leader Quality Participation Leaders Training
Insufficient negative responses on
leadership training to test hypothesis
No Evidence for Mechanism
H7 H1 and H6 independently significant Participation Both Citizens and Leaders
Insufficient negative responses on
leadership training to test hypothesis
No Evidence for Mechanism
H8 Leadership improves LG Management and Planning LG Management Leaders Training none No Evidence for Mechanism
H9 Leader Training improves LG Service Delivery LG Service Leaders Training none No Evidence for Mechanism
H10 Leaders Training Improve LG Overall LG Overall Leaders Training none No Evidence for Mechanism
Table A.1: Overall Data Analysis Plan Results
A.2 Detailed Results
H1 Individual Quantity: Individual who have been trained under the Hogaan pro-
gramme will be more likely to participate in community forums and decision-making.
Table A.2: Regression Results for H1
Dependent variable:
Participate
H1 compare H1 test
(1) (2)
Hogaan Training 2.196∗∗∗ (0.261)
Female −0.597∗∗∗ (0.130) −0.536∗∗∗ (0.134)
Age −0.001 (0.003) −0.002 (0.004)
Minority Clan −0.482∗∗∗ (0.126) −0.445∗∗∗ (0.130)
Caste −1.077∗∗∗ (0.324) −0.940∗∗∗ (0.329)
Poor 0.464∗∗∗ (0.170) 0.479∗∗∗ (0.175)
Better Off 0.861∗∗∗ (0.182) 0.775∗∗∗ (0.187)
Rich 0.344 (0.475) 0.257 (0.493)
Constant 0.608 (0.431) 0.378 (0.401)
Observations 1,592 1,592
Log Likelihood −958.924 −905.481
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,937.847 1,832.963
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,991.575 1,892.063
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.3: Model Comparison for H1
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Df 2 10.500 0.707 10 11
AIC 2 1,885.405 74.165 1,832.963 1,937.847
BIC 2 1,941.819 70.365 1,892.063 1,991.575
logLik 2 −932.202 37.789 −958.924 −905.481
deviance 2 1,864.405 75.579 1,810.963 1,917.847
Chisq 1 106.885 106.885 106.885
Chi Df 1 1.000 1 1
Pr(>Chisq) 1 0.000 0 0
H2 Individual Quality: Individuals with higher regard for the Hogaan training they
received will be more likley to participate in community forums and decision-making.
Table A.4: Regression Results for H2
Dependent variable:
Participate
H2 compare H2 test
(1) (2)
Hogaan Useful 0.443 (0.869)
Female −0.462 (0.323) −0.457 (0.323)
Age 0.001 (0.010) 0.001 (0.010)
Minority Clan −0.611∗∗ (0.311) −0.605∗ (0.311)
Caste −0.999 (0.767) −0.977 (0.769)
Poor −0.368 (0.491) −0.370 (0.492)
Better Off −0.068 (0.519) −0.078 (0.520)
Rich −0.888 (1.251) −0.900 (1.249)
Constant 2.975∗∗∗ (0.717) 2.554∗∗ (1.105)
Observations 559 559
Log Likelihood −186.054 −185.929
Akaike Inf. Crit. 390.107 391.858
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 429.042 435.120
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.5: Model Comparison for H2
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Df 2 9.500 0.707 9 10
AIC 2 390.983 1.238 390.107 391.858
BIC 2 432.081 4.297 429.042 435.120
logLik 2 −185.991 0.088 −186.054 −185.929
deviance 2 371.983 0.176 371.858 372.107
Chisq 1 0.249 0.249 0.249
Chi Df 1 1.000 1 1
Pr(>Chisq) 1 0.618 0.618 0.618
H3 Collective Quantity: Individuals in villages with greater levels of Hogaan indi-
vidual training are more likely to participate in community forums and decision-making.
Table A.6: Regression Results for H3
Dependent variable:
Participate
H3 compare H3 test
(1) (2)
Village Train % 2.094∗∗∗ (0.407)
Female −0.534∗∗∗ (0.141) −0.516∗∗∗ (0.140)
Age −0.0001 (0.004) −0.001 (0.004)
Minority Clan −0.459∗∗∗ (0.136) −0.472∗∗∗ (0.135)
Caste −1.062∗∗∗ (0.333) −1.067∗∗∗ (0.333)
Poor 0.461∗∗ (0.183) 0.427∗∗ (0.183)
Better Off 0.925∗∗∗ (0.195) 0.873∗∗∗ (0.195)
Rich 0.453 (0.483) 0.446 (0.479)
Constant 0.506 (0.448) −0.434 (0.413)
Observations 1,365 1,365
Log Likelihood −816.717 −805.252
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,653.433 1,632.503
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,705.622 1,689.911
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.7: Model Comparison for H3
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Df 2 10.500 0.707 10 11
AIC 2 1,642.968 14.800 1,632.503 1,653.433
BIC 2 1,697.767 11.109 1,689.911 1,705.622
logLik 2 −810.984 8.107 −816.717 −805.252
deviance 2 1,621.968 16.214 1,610.503 1,633.433
Chisq 1 22.930 22.930 22.930
Chi Df 1 1.000 1 1
Pr(>Chisq) 1 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
H4 Collective Quality: Individuals in villages where there is generally a high re-
gard for Hogaan training are more likely to participate in community forums and village
decision-making.
Table A.8: Regression Results for H4
Dependent variable:
Participate
H4 compare H4 test
(1) (2)
Hogaan Useful (village) −1.641 (1.865)
Female −0.522∗∗∗ (0.141) −0.522∗∗∗ (0.141)
Age −0.001 (0.004) −0.001 (0.004)
Minority Clan −0.487∗∗∗ (0.137) −0.491∗∗∗ (0.137)
Caste −1.116∗∗∗ (0.343) −1.118∗∗∗ (0.343)
Poor 0.464∗∗ (0.184) 0.460∗∗ (0.184)
Better Off 0.926∗∗∗ (0.197) 0.931∗∗∗ (0.197)
Rich 0.573 (0.502) 0.590 (0.501)
Constant 0.549 (0.434) 2.160 (1.882)
Observations 1,339 1,339
Log Likelihood −802.766 −802.382
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,625.531 1,626.763
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,677.528 1,683.960
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.9: Model Comparison for H4
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Df 2 10.500 0.707 10 11
AIC 2 1,626.147 0.871 1,625.531 1,626.763
BIC 2 1,680.744 4.548 1,677.528 1,683.960
logLik 2 −802.574 0.272 −802.766 −802.382
deviance 2 1,605.147 0.543 1,604.763 1,605.531
Chisq 1 0.768 0.768 0.768
Chi Df 1 1.000 1 1
Pr(>Chisq) 1 0.381 0.381 0.381
H5 Leadership Quantity Increases in levels of leadership training increase citizen
participation.
Table A.10: Regression Results for H5
Dependent variable:
Participate
H5 compare H5 test
(1) (2)
Leaders Trained (%) −0.050 (0.986)
Female −0.558∗∗∗ (0.142) −0.558∗∗∗ (0.142)
Age −0.0005 (0.004) −0.0005 (0.004)
Minority Clan −0.448∗∗∗ (0.138) −0.447∗∗∗ (0.138)
Caste −1.080∗∗∗ (0.334) −1.080∗∗∗ (0.334)
Poor 0.425∗∗ (0.185) 0.425∗∗ (0.186)
Better Off 0.880∗∗∗ (0.197) 0.880∗∗∗ (0.197)
Rich 0.412 (0.484) 0.412 (0.484)
Constant 0.578 (0.454) 0.621 (0.968)
Observations 1,341 1,341
Log Likelihood −801.830 −801.829
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,623.661 1,625.658
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,675.672 1,682.871
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.11: Model Comparison for H5
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Df 2 10.500 0.707 10 11
AIC 2 1,624.659 1.412 1,623.661 1,625.658
BIC 2 1,679.272 5.090 1,675.672 1,682.871
logLik 2 −801.830 0.001 −801.830 −801.829
deviance 2 1,603.659 0.002 1,603.658 1,603.661
Chisq 1 0.003 0.003 0.003
Chi Df 1 1.000 1 1
Pr(>Chisq) 1 0.960 0.960 0.960
H8 Leader Training and Planning Village leadership training related to citizens
perceptions of ability local government’s ability to plan and mange projects.
Table A.12: Regression Results for H8
Dependent variable:
Local Government Mangement and Planning
H8 compare H8 test
(1) (2)
Leaders Trained (%) 0.108 (0.207)
Female 0.094∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.094∗∗∗ (0.035)
Age −0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
Minority Clan −0.246∗∗∗ (0.035) −0.247∗∗∗ (0.035)
Caste −0.156∗ (0.085) −0.157∗ (0.085)
Poor −0.037 (0.049) −0.037 (0.049)
Better Off 0.024 (0.050) 0.024 (0.050)
Rich 0.100 (0.122) 0.100 (0.122)
Constant 1.229∗∗∗ (0.119) 1.137∗∗∗ (0.214)
Observations 1,420 1,420
Log Likelihood −2,771.230 −2,771.096
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,562.460 5,564.192
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 5,615.045 5,622.034
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.13: Model Comparison for H8
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Df 2 10.500 0.707 10 11
AIC 2 5,563.326 1.224 5,562.460 5,564.192
BIC 2 5,618.539 4.942 5,615.045 5,622.034
logLik 2 −2,771.163 0.095 −2,771.230 −2,771.096
deviance 2 5,542.326 0.190 5,542.192 5,542.460
Chisq 1 0.269 0.269 0.269
Chi Df 1 1.000 1 1
Pr(>Chisq) 1 0.604 0.604 0.604
H9 Leader Training and Service Delivery Village leadership training related to
citizens perceptions of ability local government’s ability to plan and mange projects.
Table A.14: Regression Results for H9
Dependent variable:
Local Government Service Delivery
H9 compare H9 test
(1) (2)
Leaders Trained (%) 0.357 (0.248)
Female 0.094∗ (0.049) 0.095∗ (0.049)
Age −0.003∗∗ (0.001) −0.003∗∗ (0.001)
Minority Clan −0.219∗∗∗ (0.049) −0.223∗∗∗ (0.049)
Caste −0.121 (0.120) −0.125 (0.120)
Poor 0.073 (0.071) 0.073 (0.071)
Better Off 0.099 (0.074) 0.100 (0.074)
Rich 0.079 (0.184) 0.082 (0.184)
Constant 0.369∗∗ (0.148) 0.061 (0.257)
Observations 1,420 1,420
Log Likelihood −1,889.356 −1,888.325
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,798.712 3,798.650
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 3,851.296 3,856.492
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.15: Model Comparison for H9
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Df 2 10.500 0.707 10 11
AIC 2 3,798.681 0.044 3,798.650 3,798.712
BIC 2 3,853.894 3.674 3,851.296 3,856.492
logLik 2 −1,888.840 0.729 −1,889.356 −1,888.325
deviance 2 3,777.681 1.458 3,776.650 3,778.712
Chisq 1 2.062 2.062 2.062
Chi Df 1 1.000 1 1
Pr(>Chisq) 1 0.151 0.151 0.151
H10 Leader Training and Local Government Overall Village leadership training
related to citizens perceptions of local government overall planning and service delivery.
Table A.16: Regression Results for H10
Dependent variable:
Local Government Overall
H10 compare H10 test
(1) (2)
Leaders Trained (%) 0.137 (0.146)
Female 0.115∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.115∗∗∗ (0.021)
Age −0.002∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)
Minority Clan −0.224∗∗∗ (0.022) −0.225∗∗∗ (0.022)
Caste −0.121∗∗ (0.053) −0.122∗∗ (0.053)
Poor 0.022 (0.030) 0.022 (0.030)
Better Off 0.054∗ (0.031) 0.054∗ (0.031)
Rich 0.046 (0.078) 0.046 (0.078)
Constant 2.072∗∗∗ (0.086) 1.953∗∗∗ (0.152)
Observations 1,420 1,420
Log Likelihood −3,814.006 −3,813.564
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,648.011 7,649.128
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 7,700.595 7,706.971
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.17: Model Comparison for H10
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Df 2 10.500 0.707 10 11
AIC 2 7,648.570 0.790 7,648.011 7,649.128
BIC 2 7,703.783 4.508 7,700.595 7,706.971
logLik 2 −3,813.785 0.312 −3,814.006 −3,813.564
deviance 2 7,627.570 0.624 7,627.128 7,628.011
Chisq 1 0.883 0.883 0.883
Chi Df 1 1.000 1 1
Pr(>Chisq) 1 0.347 0.347 0.347
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Appendix B
Appendix: Further Results
B.1 Further Model Results (Hogaan and Non-Imple-
mentation Villages)
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Figure 50: Perceptions of Institutional Inclusion
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Figure 51: Comparison of Non-Implementation with Levels of Hogaan Activity on Community
Perceptions of Inclusion
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Figure 52: Youth Perception of their own and Youth General Involement in the Planning Process
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Figure 53: Minority Clan Perception of their own and Minority Clan General Involement in the
Planning Process
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Figure 54: Alternate Participation Measures: Comparison Village Type
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Figure 55: Leader Perception of Youth’s Rights and Inclusion in Hogaan and Comparison Villages
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Figure 56: Percentage Having Made Contributions of Different Kinds – Further Models
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Figure 57: Included in Top Three Rights Priorities in Project and Comparison Villages – Further
Models
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Figure 58: Conflict Mechanisms in Project and Comparison Villages – Further Models
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B.2 Further Model Results (Gender Interaction)
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Figure 59: Comparison of Gender Groups on Participation Measures (4/4)
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Figure 60: Women’s Rights in Comparison to Men’s
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Figure 61: Women’s Rights in Comparison to Men’s
●
●
●
●
75 (61, 86)
81 (68, 89)
84 (74, 91)
90 (82, 94)
●
●
●
●
77 (62, 88)
80 (66, 89)
84 (71, 91)
89 (78, 94)
●
●
●
●
92 (79, 96)
92 (83, 96)
92 (88, 94)
94 (92, 96)
●
●
●
●
94 (84, 98)
94 (87, 97)
96 (93, 98)
96 (94, 98)
Trust VC
Trust DC
Trust Elders
Trust Religious Leaders
a. Non−imp
Female
a. Non−imp
Male
b. Hogaan
Female
b. Hogaan
Male
a. Non−imp
Female
a. Non−imp
Male
b. Hogaan
Female
b. Hogaan
Male
a. Non−imp
Female
a. Non−imp
Male
b. Hogaan
Female
b. Hogaan
Male
a. Non−imp
Female
a. Non−imp
Male
b. Hogaan
Female
b. Hogaan
Male
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
percentage
(a) Percentage (%)
●
●
5 (−4, 15)
5 (1, 10)**
●
●
2 (−6, 11)
5 (1, 10)**
●
●
1 (−7, 9)
2 (−1, 6)
●
●
0 (−6, 7)
0 (−2, 3)
Trust VC
Trust DC
Trust Elders
Trust Religious Leaders
a. Non−imp
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−imp
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−imp
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−imp
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
−5% 0% 5% 10% 15%
percentage difference
(b) Difference in %
●
0 (−10, 10)
●
3 (−7, 13)
●
2 (−7, 10)
●
1 (−7, 7)
Trust VC
Trust DC
Trust Elders
Trust Religious Leaders
−10% −5% 0% 5% 10%
percentage difference of differences
significance
●a none
(c) Diff. in Diff. in %
Figure 62: Comparison of Gender Groups on Trust Measures
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Figure 63: Comparison of Gender Groups on Service Delivery Measures – Further Models
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Figure 64: Comparison of Gender Groups on Community Perceptions of Inclusion – Further
Models
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Figure 65: Percentage Having Made Contributions of Different Kinds – Further Models
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Figure 66: Comparison of Gender Groups on Top Three Rights Priorities – Further Models
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Figure 67: Youth Rights in Comparison to Older People – Further Models
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Figure 68: Minority and Outcast Clan in Comparison to Majority Clan – Further Models
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Figure 69: Comparison of Gender Groups on Conflict Mechanisms – Further Models
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Figure 70: Comparison of Gender Groups on Issue Resolution – Further Models
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Figure 71: Perceptions of Institutional Inclusion – Further Models
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B.3 Further Model Results (Clan Interaction)
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Figure 72: Perceptions of Institutional Inclusion, by Clan Groups
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Figure 73: Comparison of clan Groups on Trust Measures
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Figure 74: Participation: Comparison Clan – Further Models
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Figure 75: Comparison of clan Groups on Service Delivery Measures – Further Models
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Figure 76: Comparison of clan Groups on Community Perceptions of Inclusion – Further Models
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Figure 77: Percentage Having Made Contributions of Different Kinds – Further Models
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Figure 78: Comparison of clan Groups on Top Three Rights Priorities – Further Models
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Figure 79: Minority and Outcast Clan in Comparison to Majority Clan – Further Models
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Figure 80: Comparison of clan Groups on Issue Resolution
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Figure 81: Perceptions of Institutional Inclusion – Further Models
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B.4 Further Model Results (Age Interaction – Ref:
35+)
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Figure 82: Comparison of Youth Groups on Participation Measures (1/3)
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Figure 83: Comparison of Youth Groups on Trust Measures
128
●
●
●
●
74 (60, 85)
68 (53, 81)
82 (69, 90)
85 (72, 92)
●
●
●
●
74 (59, 84)
69 (54, 81)
81 (67, 88)
84 (71, 90)
●
●
●
●
74 (59, 84)
76 (61, 86)
82 (69, 89)
86 (74, 92)
●
●
●
●
74 (59, 84)
75 (58, 85)
79 (64, 87)
81 (66, 88)
Women Involved in Planning Process
Youth Involved in Planning Process
Minority Clans Involved in Planning Process
Outcast Clans Involved in Planning Process
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
0% 25% 50% 75%
percentage
(a) Percentage (%)
●
●
−6 (−15, 2)
3 (−1, 7)
●
●
−4 (−14, 4)
3 (−1, 8)
●
●
2 (−7, 11)
4 (0, 8)*
●
●
1 (−9, 10)
2 (−2, 6)
Women Involved in Planning Process
Youth Involved in Planning Process
Minority Clans Involved in Planning Process
Outcast Clans Involved in Planning Process
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
−15% −10% −5% 0% 5% 10%
percentage difference
(b) Difference in %
●
9 (−1, 19)
●
8 (−2, 19)
●
2 (−7, 12)
●
1 (−9, 11)
Women Involved in Planning Process
Youth Involved in Planning Process
Minority Clans Involved in Planning Process
Outcast Clans Involved in Planning Process
−10% 0% 10% 20%
percentage difference of differences
significance
●a none
(c) Diff. in Diff. in %
Figure 84: Comparison of Youth Groups on Community Perceptions of Inclusion – Further
Models
129
●
●
●
●
40 (24, 54)
34 (18, 50)
68 (52, 78)
63 (48, 74)
●
●
●
●
60 (43, 74)
48 (30, 63)
70 (54, 82)
63 (45, 76)
●
●
●
●
88 (72, 94)
81 (62, 90)
85 (68, 91)
83 (66, 90)
●
●
●
●
76 (57, 87)
75 (54, 87)
85 (67, 92)
83 (64, 91)
●
●
●
●
89 (78, 94)
85 (72, 91)
82 (70, 88)
82 (68, 88)
Contribution: International Development Project
Contribution: Social Services
Contribution: Poor and Needy
Contribution: Security
Contribution: Blood
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
0% 25% 50% 75%
percentage
(a) Percentage (%)
●
●
−5 (−16, 5)
−4 (−9, 0)
●
●
−12 (−23, −3)**
−7 (−12, −3)***
●
●
−6 (−16, 2)
−1 (−5, 2)
●
●
0 (−9, 8)
−1 (−5, 2)
●
●
−4 (−13, 3)
0 (−4, 4)
Contribution: International Development Project
Contribution: Social Services
Contribution: Poor and Needy
Contribution: Security
Contribution: Blood
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
−20% −10% 0%
percentage difference
(b) Difference in %
●
1 (−11, 12)
●
4 (−6, 16)
●
5 (−4, 15)
●
−1 (−10, 9)
●
4 (−4, 13)
Contribution: International Development Project
Contribution: Social Services
Contribution: Poor and Needy
Contribution: Security
Contribution: Blood
−10% 0% 10%
percentage difference of differences
significance
●a none
(c) Diff. in Diff. in %
Figure 85: Percentage Having Made Contributions of Different Kinds – Further Models
130
●
●
●
●
85 (71, 92)
74 (58, 86)
71 (56, 82)
71 (56, 83)
●
●
●
●
62 (51, 70)
50 (39, 59)
54 (49, 57)
52 (47, 55)
●
●
●
●
8 (4, 14)
9 (5, 15)
16 (12, 19)
15 (12, 19)
●
●
●
●
42 (29, 54)
56 (41, 67)
55 (44, 64)
62 (52, 70)
●
●
●
●
83 (75, 88)
78 (68, 84)
71 (65, 76)
70 (64, 75)
●
●
●
●
4 (1, 10)
3 (1, 9)
7 (4, 12)
7 (3, 11)
●
●
●
●
2 (0, 7)
3 (0, 9)
5 (2, 12)
5 (2, 11)
Priority: Life
Priority: Justice
Priority: Equality
Priority: Education
Priority: Health
Priority: Consulted on Decisions
Priority: Free Speech
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
a. Non−implementation
35+
a. Non−implementation
Youth
b. Hogaan
35+
b. Hogaan
Youth
0% 25% 50% 75%
percentage
(a) Percentage (%)
●
●
−10 (−19, −2)**
1 (−4, 5)
●
●
−11 (−22, 0)
−2 (−7, 3)
●
●
1 (−5, 8)
0 (−4, 4)
●
●
13 (3, 24)**
7 (1, 12)**
●
●
−5 (−14, 4)
−1 (−6, 3)
●
●
−1 (−6, 4)
−1 (−3, 2)
●
●
1 (−4, 6)
0 (−3, 2)
Priority: Life
Priority: Justice
Priority: Equality
Priority: Education
Priority: Health
Priority: Consulted on Decisions
Priority: Free Speech
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
a. Non−implementation
difference
b. Hogaan
difference
−20% −10% 0% 10% 20%
percentage difference
(b) Difference in %
●
11 (1, 21)**
●
9 (−3, 21)
●
−1 (−9, 7)
●
−7 (−18, 5)
●
3 (−6, 13)
●
0 (−5, 6)
●
−1 (−7, 4)
Priority: Life
Priority: Justice
Priority: Equality
Priority: Education
Priority: Health
Priority: Consulted on Decisions
Priority: Free Speech
−20% −10% 0% 10% 20%
percentage difference of differences
significance
●a
●a
none
positive
(c) Diff. in Diff. in %
Figure 86: Comparison of Youth Groups on Top Three Rights Priorities – Further Models
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Figure 87: Women’s Rights in Comparison to Men’s – Further Models
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Figure 88: Youth Rights in Comparison to Older People – Further Models
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Figure 89: Minority and Outcast Clan in Comparison to Majority Clan – Further Models
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Figure 90: Comparison of Youth Groups on Conflict Mechanisms – Further Models
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Figure 91: Comparison of Youth Groups on Issue Resolution – Further Models
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Figure 92: Perceptions of Institutional Inclusion – Further Models
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B.5 Further Model Results (Age Interaction – Ref:
<25)
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Figure 93: Participation: Comparison Youth – Further Models
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Figure 94: Comparison of Youth Groups on Service Delivery Measures – Further Models
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Figure 95: Comparison of Youth Groups on Community Perceptions of Inclusion – Further
Models
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Figure 96: Women’s Rights in Comparison to Men’s – Further Models
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Figure 97: Youth Rights in Comparison to Older People – Further Models
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Figure 98: Minority and Outcast Clan in Comparison to Majority Clan – Further Models
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Figure 99: Perceptions of Institutional Inclusion – Further Models
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Figure 100: Comparison of Youth Groups on Trust Measures – Further Models
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Figure 101: Percentage Having Made Contributions of Different Kinds – Further Models
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Figure 102: Comparison of Youth Groups on Top Three Rights Priorities – Further Models
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Figure 103: Comparison of Youth Groups on Conflict Mechanisms – Further Models
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Figure 104: Comparison of Youth Groups on Issue Resolution – Further Models
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B.6 Institutional Support for Services and Rights
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Figure 105: Comparison of Hogaan and Non-Implementation Villages on Institutions Responsible
for Roads
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Figure 106: Comparison of Hogaan and Non-Implementation Villages on Institutions Responsible
for Resource Management
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Figure 107: Comparison of Hogaan and Non-Implementation Villages on Institutions Responsible
for Providing Clean Water
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Figure 108: Rights to Justice: Comparison Village Type
149
●
●
24 (16, 32)
21 (15, 27)
●
●
14 (9, 20)
28 (21, 35)
●
●
21 (13, 28)
12 (9, 14)
●
●
49 (34, 60)
42 (28, 54)
Elders: Right Equality
VC: Right Equality
DC: Right Equality
RL: Right Equality
comparison
hogan
comparison
hogan
comparison
hogan
comparison
hogan
0% 20% 40% 60%
percentage
(a) Percentage (%)
●
−3 (−9, 3)
●
14 (8, 21)***
●
−9 (−17, −3)**
●
−6 (−14, 1)
Elders: Right Equality
VC: Right Equality
DC: Right Equality
RL: Right Equality
−10% 0% 10% 20%
percentage difference
significance
●a
●a
●a
negative
none
positive
(b) Difference in %
Figure 109: Institutions and Equality Rights: Comparison Village Type
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Figure 110: Institutions and Education: Comparison Village Type
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Figure 111: Institutions and Health: Comparison Village Type
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Figure 112: Institutions and Consultation: Comparison Village Types
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Figure 113: Institutions and Free Speech: Comparison Village Type
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Figure 114: Institutions and Right to Life: Comparison Village Type
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Figure 115: Government Service Perceptions and Social Services and International Contributions
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Appendix C
Appendix: Diagramatic Representation of Original
and Revised Theory of Change
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Impact: Local
Government
Responsive,
Accountable
and E↵ective
Outcome 1: Citizen
Participation in
Decision Making and
hold village insti-
tutions to account
Citizens from a cross-section of the community
(including minority clans, women and youth)
have better understanding of the roles and re-
sponsibilities of formal institutions, their rela-
tionship to citizens (rights and responsibilities)
Citizens learn participation
and meeting management skills
Citizens have access to formal mechanisms for en-
gaging with village institution (both informing
decisions and holding duty-bearers to account)
Outcome 2: vil-
lage institutions
demonstrate
management of
development funds
in a transparent
and equitable way
enabling e↵ective
social development/
service delivery
at village level
Roles and responsibilities of village institutions are
agreed on and understood by institutions and com-
munities, including consultation and accountability
mechanisms and recognised in regional policies
Capacity of Village Councils to plan and manage
services (in collaboration with other local institutions)
in a way that is transparent and equitable is improved
Service delivery / social development ini-
tiatives are provided by Village Councils
Outcome 3: Village
institutions advocate
more e↵ectively to
influence district
level policy, resourc-
ing and practice
the capacity of Village Councils to prepare
and implement Advocacy Plans is improved
Village Councils advocate for resources
Participation of Village Councils in key
District Committees (Safety, Planning,
Education, Health, WASH) is improved
Outcome 4: District
level organs or
institutions respond
to the needs
represented by
village institutions
Village Council priorities reflected
in District Development Plans
Village Councils demonstrate readi-
ness to implement development activities
Outcome 5: Both
citizens and insti-
tutions have acted
to prevent (address
root causes) and
resolve conflicts
through appro-
priate channels
according to the
conflict context
Village level institutions (formal and informal) and
citizens have understanding and skills in conflict
management and have identified different approaches
and mechanisms for dealing with conflict at different
stages (from addressing root causes, inter-personal
responses and formal conflict resolution mechanisms)
Within a district, villages have collectively identi-
fied conflict issues (particularly related to natural
resource management) and agreed ways to address these
Figure 116: Original Hogaan Theory of Change
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Impact: Local Government Responsive, Accountable and Effective
Outcome 1:Citizen Participation in
Decision Making and Conflict Mitigation
Citizens trained
to coordinate
priorities with
government
stakeholders
Citizens trained
to participate
in collaborative
discussions about
local development
Outcome 2: Village Level Institutions
able to Plan, Manage and Co-ordinate
Leaders trained
in civic education
Leaders trained
in advocacy or
conflict resolution
Leaders trained
to provide trans-
parent, accessible
and account-
able services to
communities
Figure 117: Replacement Hogaan Theory of Change
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